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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the unusual legal structures of the following four deals: 
When Google went public in 2004, it used an Internet auction to sell its 
stock to shareholders. 
When Ben & Jerry's went public in 1984, it sold its stock only to Ver­
mont residents. 
Steve Jobs's contract with Apple entitles him to an annual cash salary of 
exactly one dollar. 
Stanley Works, a Connecticut toolmaker, considered reincorporating in 
Bermuda to reduce its tax liability. Under public pressure, it changed its 
mind and remains legally incorporated in Connecticut. 
What do these deals have in common? In each case, the legal infrastruc­
ture of the deal had a branding effect: the design of the deal altered the 
brand image of the company. 
The structure of each of the first three deals is difficult to understand us­
ing the traditional tools of corporate finance alone. The deals appear to be 
inefficient, at least if one thinks about efficiency in the usual way. 1 But if 
one also considers the impact of the deal on brand image, the Google, Ben 
& Jerry's, and Apple deals are success stories. The Stanley Works deal was a 
failure. But it did not fail because of some flaw in its financial design, such 
as a miscalculation of the tax savings or difficulty in communicating the tax 
benefits to its shareholders. The deal failed because its managers failed to 
predict the negative impact that its legal infrastructure would have on its 
brand image. 
The concept of branding rarely appears in academic debates about cor­
porate finance and corporate governance. Finance scholars focus their 
attention on the relationship between the firm; its investors and creditors, 
1. Deal structures with positive branding effects may appear to be inefficient in the short 
term (for example, by increasing the cost of capital). But these structures can be efficient in the long 
run by increasing revenue from product markets. In theory, if the capital markets recognize the 
positive revenue implications, there may not in fact be an increase in the cost of capital. This would 
make the deals efficient in both the short term and the long term. Evidence from the case studies 
below, however, suggests that the capital markets are slow to recognize the branding implications of 
deal structures. The stock price of Google and Ben & Jerry's rose steadily following their unusual 
IPOs, suggesting at least the possibility that the capital markets undervalued the branding effects of 
the deals. The stock price of Stanley Works jumped at the announcement of its proposed inversion, 
notwithstanding the negative branding implications that ultimately helped sink the deal. 
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who supply financial capital; and its managers, who supply human capital.2 
Contracts are efficient \,\'hen they properly align incentives; a good contract 
design is one that allows managers to raise capital cheaply and deploy it 
effectively. At best, consumers enter the discussion as the emotionless buy­
ers who make up the product markets and serve as a potential indirect check 
• 3 agamst agency costs. 
The functionality-oriented consumer. The implicit assumption in these 
debates is that consumers have no rational reason to care about the internal 
corporate governance of a firm whose products they buy. Most consumers, 
after all, have only the haziest notion of how firms interact with the capital 
markets and labor markets. Finance scholars, then, act like the editors of 
Consumer Reports. They assume that consumers only value basic product 
attributes like price, durability, resale value, and quality. Contract design, 
after all, would seem to have little effect on the absorbency of a paper towel, 
the sound quality of an mp3 player, or the creaminess of a pint of frozen 
yogurt. From this perspective, the best managerial structure is whatever 
structure produces the best products while keeping production costs and 
transaction costs low. Corporate governance is a matter for shareholders and 
managers and creditors to work out amongst themselves.  By focusing on the 
functionality of products, however, we mask any link between products and 
contract design. 
The brand-oriented consumer. Focusing only on functionality is, of 
course, problematic. Consumers choose brands, not just product attributes. 
Buying a pint of Ben & Jerry's is not the same experience as buying a pint 
of Haagen-Dazs, even if the product is similar. Brand image reflects the val­
ues of the people who create the product. In certain circumstances, I argue 
here, contract design contributes to the atmospherics of the brand. An inno­
vative deal structure may cost the company something in short-term 
efficiency, but it may pay dividends in the form of increased demand from 
consumers in the long run. Deal structure, then, is not just a method of man­
aging transaction costs. It is also an advertising medium. Unlike direct 
marketing tactics, however, the process is more subtle. Whatever its content, 
the "message" of the deal structure reaches consumers indirectly through 
early adopters or other opinion leaders-knowledgeable, sophisticated con­
sumers who experiment with new products and are particularly sensitive to 
the trustworthiness of the manufacturer. Just the sort of consumer, in other 
words, who might pay attention to deal structure. 
This Article explores the branding effect of deal structures by looking at 
four case studies. First, I examine two initial public offerings (IPOs), the 
2. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART c. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE (7th ed. 2003); RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS (2d ed. 1 995). 
3. If management shirks or lacks the talent to lead the company effectively, the firm will 
produce lower quality products, and customers will tum to competitors. In tum, this may tum the 
company into a takeover target or may lead shareholders to press the board to make a change in 
personnel. See D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons 
from Kmart, 14 N.C. L. REv. 1037 ( 1996). 
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first by Google; the second by Ben & Jerry's. From a traditional corporate 
finance perspective, the goal of a properly structured IPO is to manage the 
information asymmetry between the issuer and potential buyers in order to 
raise the largest amount of money possible per share of stock sold. From 
this perspective, the success of the Google deal is questionable. Few would 
call this deal elegant or efficient .4 But this is not really what the Google IPO 
structure was about, or at least it is not the full story. When Google struc­
tured its IPO as an auction, it reinforced Google's identity as an innovative, 
egalitarian, playful, trustworthy company. Talking about Google's IPO 
makes you want to use Google's products. 
Similarly, the Ben & Jerry's deal structure may not have been terribly ef­
ficient. By selling its stock only to Vermont residents, the company saved a 
few thousand dollars in legal and accounting fees. On the other hand, the 
geographic restriction artificially limited demand for the stock, which may 
have pushed the price down. Was the tradeoff worth it? Without considering 
consumers, the cost-benefit analysis fails to capture the essence of the deal. 
The offering was not just about selling stock and raising capital. It was also 
about selling ice cream. Selling stock to Vermonters helped build the brand 
image of the company. 
The next case study looks at Apple and its contract with its CEO, Steve 
Jobs. Jobs takes a salary of one dollar a year. He also owns a substantial 
amount of Apple stock. Executive-compensation contracts typically provide 
a mix of cash and equity designed to align the executive's incentives with 
those of the company's investors.5 But I argue here that Jobs's salary isn't 
designed to provide an efficient mix of cash and equity. His contract is a 
symbolic statement indicating that he's not in it for the money. "One Dollar" 
feeds the cult of the Mac. 
The last case study looks at Stanley Works, a Connecticut toolmaker. In 
2002 Stanley Works considered reincorporating in the tax haven of Ber­
muda. Conventional wisdom holds that there is no patriotic duty to pay 
more in taxes than one is legally required to pay. 6 Stanley Works was within 
its rights, legally speaking, to reincorporate in Bermuda. One would expect 
a well-advised corporation managed by rational profit-maximizing agents to 
do so. But Stanley Works' reincorporation, or rather its failure to close the 
deal, was not ultimately about taxes. It was about selling hammers and 
screwdrivers in the heartland. Corporate expatriation won't play in Peoria.7 
What can we learn from these case studies? Innovative deal structures 
allow us to peer through the gossamer corporate veil and spy the values of 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 59--66. 
5. See Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, Remuneration: Where We 'v e 
Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them (Eur. Corp. Governance 
Inst., Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), av ailable at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561 305. 
6. See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 8 10  (2d Cir. 1 934). 
7. "Will it play in Peoria?", a phrase that originated during Peoria's successful vaudeville 
days, has become a commonly used metaphor for measuring whether something will appeal to the 
mainstream American public. See Jennifer S. Everett, Will it Play in Peoria, 
http://www.historicpeoria.com/select.cfm?chose=23 1 (last visited Feb. 10, 2006). 
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the company's founders and managers. Like the Emperor penguins stoically 
waddling in single file to their breeding ground,8 unusual deal structures 
anthropomorphize the firm in the eyes of consumers. Innovative deal struc­
tures are striking, and they can marginally affect the set of mental 
associations that make up brand image. Google is not just a network of con­
nected contracts;9 it is playful and innovative. Ben & Jerry's isn't just a 
manufacturer of a dessert product; it's a loyal companion. 
Deal structure, then, is a specialized kind of advertising medium, and it 
fits some firms better than others. Reputation and brand image are espe­
cially important for firms that produce expensive credence goods like 
medical treatment, financial advice, or an Ivy League education.'° Consum­
ers, skeptical of self-serving claims, tum to sources of information in 
addition to traditional advertising, such as newspaper articles, U.S. News 
Rankings, 11 word-of-mouth, product reviews on Amazon.com, or biogs. 
Deal structure provides these opinion leaders with another source of infor­
mation. Deal structure, then, is more likely to prove effective as an 
advertising medium for companies that rely heavily on opinion leaders to 
drive demand, such as consumer-technology companies or manufacturers of 
trendy consumer goods and cult brands. These companies seek consumers 
who highly value attributes like innovation, creativity, coolness, or altruism, 
and not just functionality. For these companies, the legal infrastructure of 
deals provides early adopters with a window through which they can view, 
or imagine, the soul of the company. 
* * * 
Roadmap and clarification of terms. Following this introduction, I have 
organized this Article into three main sections. In Section II below, I briefly 
review the literature on the lawyer's role in structuring deals. Many would 
consider branding a "business issue" of little concern to lawyers; Section II 
explains why responsible lawyers should consider the institutional and so­
cial context in which deals are done. The case studies in Section III explore 
in some detail how the legal infrastructure of deals can have a branding ef­
fect. In Section IV, I conceptualize the role of branding as it relates to deal 
structure. Certain legal events in the lifecycle of the company-what I call 
branding moments-provide opportunities for firms to signal company val­
ues. I also consider the mechanisms by which knowledge of innovative 
structures spreads to consumers, which in tum provides some insight into 
8. See LA MARCHE DE L'EMPEREUR [MARCH OF THE PENGUINS] (Bonne Pioche 2005). 
9. See G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 887 (2000). 
10. Credence goods are items for which the quality cannot be easily assessed even after the 
purchase has been made, such as financial advice or auto repair. See Michael R. Darby & Edi Kami, 
Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 1 6  J.L. & EcoN. 67 (1973). 
11. See Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure 
Scholarly Pelformance, 8 1  IND. L.J. 1 (2006); Posting of Victor Fleischer to Conglomerate, 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/08/branding_legal_.html (Aug. 1 2, 2005). 
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what companies might be best suited to take advantage of the branding ef­
fects of corporate deal structuring. 
Before proceeding further, it may be useful to clarify what I mean by 
"deals" or the "legal infrastructure of deals." It may seem obvious that deal­
makers think about brand image. When Canon hires Maria Sharapova or 
Andre Agassi as a spokesperson, the deal has a branding effect. But my fo­
cus here is not on the branding implications of run-of-the-mill advertising 
transactions. This Article focuses instead on the sorts of deals for which a 
firm might engage outside legal counsel. These deals include IPOs, mergers 
and acquisitions, securities offerings, executive-compensation arrangements, 
and other matters of internal corporate governance. This Article, in other 
words, focuses on contracts in which the branding implications are non­
obvious, and in which lawyers may have an institutional role in advising the 
client. 12 
Lastly, I do not wish to overstate the importance of branding. The deals I 
highlight here involve some unusual companies. This Article does not pur­
port to prove that branding concerns caused the founders or managers to 
adopt these structures, nor does it suggest that every deal has important 
branding implications. 13 I certainly do not mean to suggest that these deals 
originated in the marketing departments of these companies. Rather, this 
Article claims that deal structures sometimes have branding implications 
(whether by design or accident) and that lawyers ignore the implications at 
their peril. The ethereal link between product markets and capital markets is 
what makes the branding effects of deal structures both challenging and 
promising as a new avenue of research. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF DEALS 
What determines the legal infrastructure of deals? In Value Creation by 
Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, Ronald Gilson argues that 
the defining activity of the corporate lawyer is minimizing transaction 
costs. 14 Transaction costs do not refer simply to the costs associated with 
12. It may also be worth noting that this Article is not about the marketing of financial prod­
ucts to investors. While financial innovation and the marketing of financial products are important 
topics, those topics are beyond the scope of this Article. I am not focusing on how investment banks 
change the legal structure of securities in order to sell securities. Rather, I am interested in how 
firms and their lawyers tweak the legal structure of contracts in order to sell more widgets. 
13. These case studies do not prove that concerns about branding caused the companies to 
adopt the structures I discuss. That is not the goal of this Article. Rather, I want to suggest that the 
structures had branding effects. The case studies do generate some testable hypotheses that addi­
tional empirical research could help prove or disprove. See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, 
Counteifactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1517 (2004). In addition, the Article 
contributes to the legal-profession literature by suggesting that deal lawyers should be aware of 
branding implications notwithstanding the occasional admonition from clients to stick to the "legal 
issues" and leave the business concerns to other professionals. 
14. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset P ricing, 
94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). Another important strand of the literature emphasizes the decision-making 
process and long-term contracts. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, P rinciples of Relational 
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"papering" the deal. Transaction costs include the costs of searching for an 
appropriate exchange partner, negotiating the terms of the deal, producing 
information, policing strategic behavior, and enforcing the contract. Gilson 
focuses on deal hurdles that lawyers commonly address, like asymmetric 
information and moral hazard. These problems can require costly monitor­
ing by deal participants, cause buyers to discount the projected value of 
assets, or even suffocate deals altogether under a blanket of suspicion. 
Drawing on the work of economists and finance theorists like Ronald Coase, 
Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen,15 Gilson argues that when lawyers 
structure deals, they increase efficiency. Lawyers add value to the deal by 
designing contracts that facilitate the flow of information and properly align 
incentives. When the buyer and seller disagree about the value of an asset, 
for example, lawyers might draft an earn-out agreement that links the price 
of the asset to the actual earnings it generates. 16 
Asymmetric information and strategic behavior are not the only costs 
that transactional lawyers consider. Regulatory costs also affect deal struc­
ture.17 Accounting treatment, tax incentives, antitrust concerns, and financial 
intermediation rules may all come into play. 
Ron Gilson, Victor Goldberg, David Schizer, and others at Columbia 
Law School have developed an empirical case-study approach to examine 
how deal lawyers create value when they engineer the legal infrastructure of 
transactions.18 This Article adds a Gen-X flavor to the "Deals" approach, 
extending and updating the work of the Columbia School with a brand­
conscious examination of deal structuring. 19 I agree with the basic premise 
of the Columbia School that the primary purpose of the legal infrastructure 
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Oliver Hart, Financial Contracting, 39 J. ECON. LITERA­
TURE 1079, 1083-98 (2001). 
15. See, e.g. , Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. EcoN. REV. 323 (1986); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309-
10 (1976) (discussing how agency problems can affect firm structure); Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas 
S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That 
Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. EcoN. 187, 195-98 (1984) (examining the effect of information 
asymmetry on firm structure). 
16. See Gilson, supra note 14, at 262-65 (explaining how an earn-out agreement manages 
information asymmetry). 
17. See id. at 246. But see Merton H. Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261, 262 (1977) ("I 
will argue that even in a world in which interest payments are fully deductible in computing corpo­
rate income taxes, the value of the firm, in equilibrium will still be independent of its capital 
structure."). 
18. For a discussion of the Columbia approach, see Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corpo­
rate Transactions into the Law School Classroom, 2002 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. 475. 
19. Generation X refers to Americans born roughly between 1965 and 1975. Our relationship 
to brands and branding tends to be more complex and nuanced than the Baby Boomers'. We are 
postmodernist, not modernist. Rather than earnestly fighting marketing and consumerism, we resign 
ourselves to it or embrace it with a sense of irony. We acknowledge that brands help form our iden­
tity, and we ultimately accept consumerism even as we recognize its drawbacks. For our generation, 
the purchasing decision is rarely based only on functionality. Image matters more than it did before. 
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of deals is to minimize transaction costs and regulatory costs.20 But I argue 
here that deal structure may also affect a company's brand image. Contract 
design helps form the identity of the firm and consumers' perception of the 
firm. 
While the literatures on both corporate finance and branding are exten­
sive, linking the two together is a new idea.21 The corporate finance 
literature rarely discusses branding. Black & Gilson's textbook on the Law 
and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions, for example, never mentions brand­
ing. Neither does the leading corporate finance textbook.22 Of course, I can 
hardly claim to be the first scholar to emphasize the importance of under­
standing the social context in which contracts are made. Beginning with the 
"law in action" scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, 23 scholars such as Ian 
MacNeil,24 Robert Ellickson,25 and Lisa Bemstein26 have considered the im-
20. See also Manuel A. Utset, Producing Information: Initial Public Offerings, Production 
Costs, and the Producing Lawyer, 74 OR. L. REV. 275 (1995) (drawing a distinction between the 
lawyer's role in managing transaction costs and the lawyer's role in producing information). 
21. Corporate finance scholars have considered whether brand image affects investors' pref­
erences. See Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference 
in Domestic Portfolios, 54 J. FIN. 2045 (1999); Laura Frieder & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Brand 
Perceptions and the Market for Common Stock, 40 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 57 (2005); Gur 
Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REv. FIN. STUD. 659 (2001). Only a few, however, 
have touched on whether a firm's capital markets decisions affect consumer preferences. See James 
C. Brau & Stanley E. Fawcett, Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory and Practice, 61 J. 
FIN. 399 (2006) (finding that many high-tech firms go public for strategic reasons related to reputa­
tion rather than out of a need for capital); Elizabeth Demers & Katharina Lewellen, The Marketing 
Role of IPOs: Evidence from Internet Stocks, 68 J. FIN. EcoN. 413 (2003). A recent paper by law 
professor Kim Krawiec considers whether law firm structuring decisions lead to changes in status, 
which could be considered a branding effect. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Form as 
Status and Signal, 40 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 977 (2005). 
22. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 2. The leading marketing textbooks, for that matter, 
contain no references to financial structure. Marketing scholars have only begun recently to test the 
effect of run-of-the-mill branding on shareholder value, let alone to consider whether financial con­
tract design could itself affect brand equity, which in tum could affect firm value. See, e.g., Thomas 
J. Madden, Frank Fehle & Susan M. Fournier, Brands Matter: An Empirical Demonstration of the 
Creation of Shareholder Value Through Brands (May 2, 2002) (working paper on file with the au­
thor), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=346953 (noting the "deeply 
embedded cultural condition that distances marketing from the broader executive functions of the 
firm" and, as an attempt to provide "a bridge across the marketing-finance divide," offering what the 
authors contend is a "clear and compelling empirical demonstration of the relationship between 
branding and the creation of shareholder value."). 
23. See Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465; Stewart 
Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW & Soc'y 
REV. 507 (1977); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 
28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963). 
24. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CON­
TRACTUAL RELATIONS 71-117 (1980) (describing modem contract law in relational terms); Ian R. 
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). 
25. See ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
57-58 (1991). 
26. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code 's Search 
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the 
Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry , 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 
(1992). 
June 2006] Brand New Deal 1589 
portance of noncontractual mechanisms on deal structure. Broadly speaking, 
these scholars argue that to understand deals, we must look outside the four 
comers of the contract and consider the institutional and social context in 
which the parties strike a deal. Contract law, narrowly defined, exerts less 
influence on transactions than we might expect.27 In relational agreements, it 
is common for contract terms to be incomplete. Transactions are often en­
forced outside of the courtroom by community norms and social sanctions. 
What is particularly new about this Article, then, is not its focus outside the 
four comers of the agreement, but rather its consideration of the reputational 
impact that the contract design itself has in the eyes of those who are not 
parties to the contract (consumers and employees).28 
The link between corporate finance and branding may change the pro­
fessional responsibilities of transactional lawyers. Branding has received 
scant attention from the legal academy, outside of trademark scholars.29 
Corporate lawyers traditionally draw a line, albeit a fuzzy one, between le­
gal issues and business issues.30 If Gilson is right that lawyers are 
transaction-cost engineers, then the distinction between legal issues and 
27. Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Anifact, 37 LAW & Soc'y REv. 91, 96 (2003) 
("The key finding here is that 'Contract Law,' as the doctrinalists study it, exerts remarkably little 
influence on a remarkably wide range of transactions."). 
28. This Article also draws conceptually on a research agenda proposed by sociologist Mark 
Suchman in a recent article analyzing contracts as "social artifacts." Id. Starting with the intuitive 
point that the meaning of a contract depends on its social context, Suchman explores the idea that 
contracts are tools. Like a screwdriver used as a door stop, contracts may be used in ways its design­
ers may not have originally intended. See id. at 109. Suchman notes: 
Employed with a little ingenuity, detailed contingency provisions can serve to discourage close 
reading, as much as to ensure mutual agreement; standard-form contracts can serve to disem­
power front-line sales staff, as much as to constrain transaction partners; and dispute resolution 
procedures can serve to extract proprietary business information as much as to determine fair 
remedies. Far from undermining the engineering metaphor, such instances of user creativity 
simply demonstrate the need for ethnographies of contract practice, parallel to the existing eth­
nographies of other technology practices. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
These "off-label" uses of contracts may change the way that we measure efficiency and may 
force the use of multiple design criteria. Id. at 109-10 ("Researchers have already begun to explore 
various extra-contractual influences on contract blueprints, and future investigations will almost 
certainly explore the extra-contractual consequences of such blueprints, as well. As these explora­
tions proceed, even the meaning of technical efficacy itself may expand to incorporate multiple 
design criteria, rather than transaction-cost minimization alone. The engineering metaphor provides 
little reason to believe that efficient, positive-sum collaboration will always be the sole, or even the 
primary, technical objective in contract design."). 
Suchman's approach does not undermine the notion of transaction-cost minimization as a 
measure of contract efficiency, but it stresses that the efficiency of contract design may vary depend­
ing on the user. Deals are not one-size-fits-all; your mileage may vary. Branding, then, is just one 
way of measuring the success or failure of a particular contract design, by a particular firm, in a 
particular product market. 
29. For an overview of the legal framework that protects investments in reputation, see Wil­
liam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 
265 (1987). 
30. But see Jill Schachner Chanen, The Strategic Lawyer, A.B.A. J., July 2005, at 43, 45-47 
(discussing increasing pressure for lawyers to think strategically about the business implications of 
legal decisions). 
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business issues begins to break down. Designing the structure of a deal is an 
endeavor that must be pursued jointly between lawyers and other profes­
sionals. Lawyers add value to transactions by allocating risks properly 
through contract, and their negotiations and decisions affect incentives and 
change how businesses run operations moving forward.31 And if I am right 
that deal structures have branding effects, then the distinction between legal 
and business decisions breaks down even further. Lawyers can and should 
include the deal's effect on brand equity in their back-of-the-envelope cost­
benefit analysis of different deal structures, in addition to the effect on man­
agers, shareholders, employees, and creditors. 
What is not clear from these case studies is whether, as a general matter, 
lawyers are particularly talented when it comes to understanding the brand­
ing implications of deal structures. But whether they are naturaliy suited to 
the task or not, they are inevitably involved in the decision-making process 
that leads to the final structure of the deal. The clearest example of a situa­
tion in which counsel ought to speak up is when a structure is efficient from 
the point of view of managing transaction costs and regulatory costs but 
would produce negative branding effects, as in the Stanley Works case. 
Lawyers should not only listen to the branding concerns of management, but 
also ask the right questions and draw on their prior experience in structuring 
deals. For some deals, like IPOs or major acquisitions, the lawyers may have 
vastly more experience than management. Investment bankers, of course, 
may be in an even stronger position to advise the client. 
Even if one hesitates to embrace this expansive notion of the role of the 
deal lawyer, it's not clear that lawyers can responsibly avoid any and all 
consideration of branding. As explained more below, unusual deal structures 
not otherwise explained by transaction-cost concerns or regulatory-cost 
concerns might then be explained by either managerial consumption on the 
one hand or branding and consumer signaling on the other. Consumer sig­
naling may be an appropriate action for the firm, but managerial 
consumption is not. Only by considering the branding implications can 
counsel determine whether the firm is acting in the best interests of the 
shareholders. 
Consider the predicament of Google's outside counsel. Should Wilson 
Sonsini have permitted the founders to include a "letter" to shareholders in 
the prospectus, even though it was likely to complicate and delay the SEC 
approval process? Should the founders have been permitted to indulge in 
math humor when they chose the number of shares to be issued? Some law-
31. The view of the lawyer-as-hired-gun is more of a straw man than an accurate depiction 
of how many transactional lawyers spend their time advising clients. See Ian Ayres, Never Confuse 
Efficiency with a liver Complaint, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 503, 513. Most scholars and practitioners 
recognize that the line between business and legal issues is not so clear. See Robert A. Kagan & 
Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 
407 (1985) (discussing the dominant image of lawyer as independent counselor in connection with 
JAMES STEWART, THE PARTNERS (1983)). They can "fill a managerial void with the uncommitted 
resources of intellect, energy, and experience that only large law firms have on tap, thus bolstering 
the corporation's adaptive capacities." Id.; see also id. at 410 (describing aspects of the dominant 
image of lawyers as counselors). 
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yers would articulate a professional responsibility to fight with the founders 
and managers on these points. After all, if the actions merely reflect the 
idiosyncratic preferences of quirky founders, then company counsel has a 
duty to step in and protect the shareholders. But if I am right that deal struc­
tures have branding implications, it follows that lawyers have a 
responsibility to help the founders consider the risks (and rewards) of the 
unusual contract design. That the deal may tarnish or enhance a firm's brand 
image becomes yet another factor for the lawyers to consider, not unlike 
accounting risk, tax risk, or counterparty credit risk. Indeed, lawyers may be 
especially well suited to advise their clients about the nonlegal effects of 
legal decisions, including branding effects.32 
II. CASE STUDIES 
This Section considers the branding effects of four deals. They are not 
representative of all deals, nor do they provide a comprehensive view of the 
ways in which the legal infrastructure of deals can have branding effects. 
But they are tangible stories that help illustrate how and why branding mat­
ters. In Section IV, I offer a more systematic approach to thinking about 
branding and deal structure. Before getting to the theory, however, it may be 
useful to consider some real-world examples. 
A. Google 
Last summer, Google went public in a highly public manner. Rather than 
use the traditional underwriter-led book-building process, Google instead 
sold its stock to the public using an Internet auction. Wall Street watched the 
deal closely and criticized it extensively. After several delays, the auction 
closed successfully with an offering price of $85. The stock closed its first 
day of trading at $ 100 for a first-day pop of 1 8%. The stock then began its 
steady climb towards $400. The numerous problems Google faced in exe­
cuting the deal suggest it was hardly a model of efficiency. Nor was it a 
model of egalitarianism.33 But, I argue here, the deal was a success on its 
own terms. There was more than short-term efficiency at stake. Google used 
the IPO as a branding event, and the auction structure created branding ef­
fects in a way the traditional IPO structure would not have. 
32. Kagan and Rosen explain: 
More detached and independent than a corporate chief executive's subordinates, the lawyer 
can feel free to warn business executives that even if proposed actions do not violate the law 
per se, they might nevertheless be ethically questionable or might lead to popular or political 
attacks, adverse reactions by customers or competitors, or intensified governmental scrutiny. 
Id. at 410. We are used to giving this lawyerly role the more dignified name of counseling. But when 
we talk about "popular or political attacks" or "adverse reactions by customers," we are already 
talking about branding. Kagan and Rosen believe, however, that the dominant image was in decline 
even as they wrote the article twenty years ago. Id. at 422-31. 
33. See Christine Hurt, What Google Can 't Tell Us about Internet Auctions (And What It 
Can) , 37 U. ToL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=753625. 
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1. The Timing of the Deal 
Sergey Brin and Larry Page met as computer science graduate students 
in 1 995. The two founded Google and developed a search technology based 
on the "back links" to websites. By 1 999, the company began to grow, and it 
received $25 million in financing from Sequoia Capital and Kleiner Perkins, 
two leading venture capital firms. The company could have gone public ear­
lier, when the equity markets were hungry for any technology company, let 
alone one with Google's strong track record and promising future. Eric 
Schmidt (the CEO), Brin, and Page held off.34 They enjoyed the freedom of 
remaining a private company, and they had no pressing need for cash.35 
Google went public in the summer of 2004. The timing was a bit puz­
ziing. Compaiiies normally go public because they need additional equity 
capital. Google had no pressing need for cash, and so in theory it could have 
remained a private company.36 For several reasons, it made sense for Google 
to go public when it did. None of these reasons, however, required Google 
to maximize its short-term share price. 
Backdoor public company. The precipitating event was somewhat un­
usual. One advantage Google enjoyed as a private company is that it could 
hold its business strategy close to the vest. Its growth, however, eventually 
made this strategy impossible. Like most start-ups, Google had given stock 
to employees. As it recruited programmers and engineers, more and more 
employees became stockholders. Under the securities laws, any company 
with 300 stockholders has to make certain public filings. These public fil­
ings would have required some disclosure of Google's business plan and 
prospects, making Google a "backdoor" public company.37 And because 
Google would have had to make aspects of its business strategy public under 
the required filings, the founders lost a key reason for remaining privately 
owned. 
Liquidity. Going public made sense for other reasons as well. Employees 
who receive stock and options expect to sell at some point.38 Without a liq-
34. See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: How GooGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES 
OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 2 1 3  (2005) ("In an interview with the San Fran­
cisco Chronicle in the fall of 2001 ,  Eric Schmidt laid down what would become the triumvirate's 
standard answer to the IPO question. 'The IPO question we've debated internally, but frankly, we're 
profitable,' Schmidt said. 'We're generating cash. We don't ever need to go public.' "). 
35. The company was already profitable by 200 1 .  See Google Inc., Registration Statement 
(Form S-1 )  (Apr. 29, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/ 
0001 193 12504073639/ds l .htm#toc l 6 1 67_1 l .  
36. Other scholars have noted, of course, that the reasons for going public may be more 
complicated. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of 
Stock Market P ricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 645 (1988) (arguing that 
firms rarely use equity issues to raise capital). 
37. Becoming a backdoor public company also refers to a process in which a larger privately 
held company merges with a shell company that is publicly traded. I use the term here to refer to the 
accidental method of becoming a company required to make public filings simply by accumulating 
at least 300 stockholders. 
38. Another liquidity option is to borrow against the stock. Without a public market, how­
ever, lenders would have difficulty valuing the stock. 
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uid market for shares, employees could not capture the full value of their 
options. Going public allowed the founders, employees, and investors to sell 
and thereby diversify their portfolios.39 
Because excessive insider selling would have depressed the stock price 
(which would have been self-defeating), selling was limited by contract. The 
founders, venture capitalists, and employees sold some shares in the IPO 
and in secondary offerings in the months following the IPO, but most of 
their equity would remain locked up in Google for a relatively long time. 
Acquisition currency. A third reason for going public was to facilitate 
acquisitions. Companies often use their own stock as acquisition currency. 
Google was eyeing some potentially large acquisitions, and having a liquid 
market for its stock would facilitate tax-free acquisitions. After announcing 
the IPO, Google acquired Picasa, a digital photo management company;40 
Keyhole, a digital mapping company;41 Urchin, a web analytics company;42 
and Dodgeball, a social networking site.43 
But there was no pressing need for cash. A higher share price would 
make any stock-for-stock acquisitions cheaper. At the same time, Google's 
advertising products were generating sufficient cash flow to meet the com­
pany's operating needs. Google had some desire to build a war chest for 
future acquisitions, but had no immediate big targets. Moreover, the IPO 
would not be Google's last chance to raise money in the equity markets, as 
evidenced by their recent follow-on offering.44 
In sum, Google had to go public, but it was less concerned about short­
term share price than many other companies. Maximizing the offering price 
(so as to maximize the amount of capital raised) was not as important as 
building long-term value. The IPO presented itself as a perfect branding 
moment. 
Despite Google's enviable position, it faced a few challenges. The tim­
ing of the IPO was not ideal. The dot-com bubble was over. Few companies 
went public in 2004, and it was hard to imagine an Internet technology 
company, even Google, receiving a warm reception from gun-shy investors. 
But with the threat of becoming a "backdoor" public company looming, and 
increasing pressure to provide liquidity for employees and the venture capi­
talists, the IPO had to be executed one way or another. It was a treacherous 
39. Schmidt has acknowledged that the presence of venture investors (and their demands for 
liquidity) made an IPO inevitable. BATTELLE, supra note 34, at 2 14. 
40. Google Press Release, Google Acquires Picasa, http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/ 
picasa.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
4 1 .  Google Press Release, Google Acquires Keyhole Corp, http://www.google.com/press/ 
pressrel/keyhole.htrnl (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
42. Google Press Release, Google Agrees to Acquire Urchin, http://www.google.com/intl/en/ 
press/pressrel/urchin.htrnl (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
43. John Markoff, 14,159,265 New Slices of Rich Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2005, at 
C l .  
44. A follow-on offering occurs when a company offers new shares to the market at some 
point in time after an IPO. A secondary offering, by contrast, occurs when an existing shareholder 
sells a block of shares to the market. 
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situation. The way out was to think creatively, or, as Apple-lovers might say, 
to "think different" about the IPO process.45 
2. The Appeal of the Auction Structure 
IPOs have an image problem. Before the dot-com bubble burst, tech 
IPOs were associated with severe underpricing and huge first-day pops. In­
siders got rich; companies left money on the table; retail investors got hurt 
when the bubble eventually burst.46 The challenge for Google was to tum a 
process associated with greed into something positive. Structuring its IPO as 
an auction did the trick. 
It may be useful here to review briefly the traditional IPO process. Jn a 
traditional IPO, a company that needs capital approaches the underwriters 
who will help take the company public. The underwriters set up a road show 
where managers talk with potential investors. The underwriters also meet 
with institutional investors and discuss the company behind closed doors, 
setting the price through a process known as "book-building." Underwriters 
then follow up with investors, who express indications of interest and the 
price at which they would be willing to buy the stock. Based on these indi­
cations of interest, the underwriters and the company agree on a price. 
Critics of the traditional IPO process focus on two controversial aspects: 
pricing and allocation. Pricing an IPO is more art than science. For reasons 
that remain controversial, the company and its underwriters typically set the 
price somewhat lower than the anticipated market price. During the dot-com 
bubble, Internet stocks debuted with first-day pops of 100% or more, creat­
ing opportunities for abusive practices that benefited Wall Street insiders 
d . 47 an corporate executives. 
Underpricing has received a great deal of academic attention.48 Histori­
cally, IPOs are underpriced by an average of eighteen percent. Most 
45. Apple's "Think Different" ad campaign featured pictures of creative thinkers like Albert 
Einstein, Jim Henson, John Lennon, Mahatma Gandhi, and Ted Turner. Apple received some flak 
for the apparent grammatical error, although some have pointed out that "Different" may not be an 
adverb modifying "Think", but rather an object of the verb "Think," a use which could be acceptable 
vernacular, like "think big" or "think playful." See Multimedia Language Lab, Apple's Think Differ­
ent Campaign, http://www.bu.edu/celop/mll/callffechNote-think_different.html (last visited Feb. 7, 
2006); Invention Convention, http://www.inventionconvention.com/grammar.html (last visited Feb. 
7, 2006). 
46. Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 7 1 1  
(2005). 
47. Id. at 7 1 5. 
48. E.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public Of ­
ferings are Underpriced, 4 1  UCLA L. REV. 17 ( 1 993); Richard A .  Booth, The Efficient Market, 
Ponfolio Theory, and the Downward Sloping Demand Hypotheses, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 187, 1203-
1 1  ( 1993) (arguing that a downward-sloping demand curve explains the phenomenon of underpric­
ing); Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 19 CAL. L. REV. 
1 055, 1 095 ( 199 1 )  (noting the growth in popularity of Dutch auctions); Sean J. Griffith, Spinning 
and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial 
P ublic Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 658-61 (2004) (arguing that IPO allocation practices 
harm issuers, and proposing that individuals should be barred from participating in IPOs ). 
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financial economists believe that the traditional book-building process is 
efficient, despite (or because of) underpricing. Underpricing may be neces­
sary to compensate institutional investors for investing in price-discovery 
activities, or to compensate them for the risk of investing in bad deals. Bruce 
Johnsen and others argue that syndicates, along with underpricing, improve 
the efficiency of the system by discouraging overinvestment in information­
seeking behavior by potential investors.49 In their model, underpricing al­
lows the investors to "buy blind" rather than engage in a competition to 
unearth information about the company to price the issue more accurately.50 
Whatever its efficiency, the book-building process still smells fishy to 
legal scholars, who tend to focus more on egalitarian considerations than 
economists do.51 The SEC's mission is to protect the small investor.52 In re­
cent years legal scholars have become more interested in the "Dutch 
auction" model of selling stock in IPOs. The investment bank Hambrecht 
has developed and refined an "Auction IPO" model in the United States.53 
An auction uses a different price-revealing mechanism than the tradi­
tional book-building process. In an auction, investors bid on the Internet for 
the issuer's stock. The clearing price-that is, the price at which the com­
pany sells the stock to the underwriters-is set at the highest price at which 
the company can sell the number of shares it wants to sell. Anyone who has 
placed a bid higher than the clearing price receives an allocation of shares at 
the clearing price, even if they bid higher. Bidders thus may go ahead and 
disclose their reservation price. If they guess too high, they will not be pun­
ished, but instead will receive stock at the clearing price, like everyone 
else.54 Because the bids of investors correlate closely with the bids that arise 
in the secondary market after trading begins, underpricing the stock may be 
55 unnecessary. 
49. Yoram Barze!, Michel A. Habib & D. Bruce Johnsen, Prevention is Better than Cure: 
Precluding Information Acquisition in IPOs (Apr. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
author). 
50. Id. at 1 .  
51 .  A few legal scholars believe that egalitarian concerns have no place in the IPO regulatory 
landscape. E.g., Ely R. Levy, The Law and Economics of /PO Favoritism and Regulatory Spin, 33 
Sw. U. L. REV. 185,  2 1 6  (2004) (arguing that pro rata allocations are harmful because they interfere 
with the price-revealing mechanism that institutional investors provide as part of the book-building 
process). Most legal scholars, however, believe that transparency and democratic access are impor­
tant values to be protected by regulation. See, e.g. , Sean J. Griffith, The Puzzling Persistence of the 
Fixed Price Offering: Implicit Price Discrimination in IPOs, 1 8  (Oct. 3 1 ,  2005) (unpublished manu­
script, on file with author), available at http://ssm.com/abstract==797865 ("The loser in this bargain 
is the issuer and, of course, the transparency and efficiency of the primary market."). 
52. See The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integ­
rity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 
1 8, 2006). 
53. Selling stock through auctions has historically been more common overseas. 
54. In a pure Dutch auction, bidders pay the price they bid, not the clearing price. 
55. Even in a Dutch auction, some underpricing may be necessary to compensate investors 
for risk. 
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The differences between auctions and book-building go beyond the 
technological leap from the telephone to the Internet. Using an auction af­
fects not only the price mechanism, but also the allocation mechanism. 
Unlike a traditional IPO, anyone with a computer can participate.56 Auctions 
are more democratic and egalitarian. Because the allocation process elimi­
nates favoritism, it also eliminates the possibility of using underpriced IPO 
shares to benefit insiders or curry favor with clients. Christine Hurt has ad­
vocated a move towards auction IPOs to reduce moral hazard. Other legal 
scholars remain skeptical. Anita Indira Anand argues that auction structures 
may not reduce underpricing and that fairness in allocation may not lead to 
an improvement in market efficiency.57 Peter Oh argues that Dutch auctions 
are risky and susceptible to fraud, and he shows that the benefits are un-
5s proven. 
When Google announced its intentions to conduct an IPO by auction, 
the financial press took notice. Google would become by far the largest and 
most prominent company to sell IPO stock by auction. The financial press 
pitched the story as Silicon Valley populism versus Wall Street capitalism, 
making it the deal to watch during an otherwise sleepy summer for the capi­
tal markets. Google scored some early PR victories. It strong-armed the 
white-shoe underwriters into cutting their usual hefty fees, and it forced 
them to accept a more democratic IPO process. No more Friends of Frank;59 
Google would conduct its auction according to its company mantra, Don't 
Be Evil. 
3. Execution of the Deal 
Conducting an Internet auction forced Google into the role of regulatory 
entrepreneur.6() Securities laws prohibit offers to sell securities until a regis­
tration statement is effective; the registration statement cannot become 
56. Ironically, this may lead institutional investors to react like Groucho Marx: because 
anyone can participate, it's not clear why anyone would want to participate. Without underpricing, 
investors have no incentive to bid on the IPO stock because they can wait and acquire the stock in 
the secondary market at the same price. 
57. Anita Indira Anand, Is the Dutch Auction /P O a Good Idea? (Yale Law Sch. Ctr. for 
Law, Econ. & Pub. Pol'y, Working Paper No. 320, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/ 
abstract=794464. Anand points to institutional considerations that make price discovery more effi­
cient in book-built offerings. Id. at 1 1 -18. Analyzing the IPO process as a public good, she argues 
that the results of allowing unimpeded access to retail investors may be undesirable from a market­
efficiency standpoint. Id. at 22-30. Anand notes that larger, more widely known issuers may benefit 
from an auction mechanism, particularly for follow-on and secondary offerings. See id. at 40. 
Somewhat generously, she describes Google's IPO as successful from an efficiency standpoint. Id. 
at 33. 
58. Peter B. Oh, The Dutch Auction Myth (William Mitchell Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 33, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=890127. 
59. "Friends of Frank" refers to friends and clients of CSFB's Frank Quattrone, who led 
many of the high-profile tech IPOs. Friends of Frank received allocations of underpriced IPO shares 
in return for the promise of future investment banking business. 
60. See A Taxing Blog, http://vic.typepad.com/taxingblog/2005/04/google_as_regul.html 
(Apr. 26, 2005). 
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effective until the final price is determined. In an auction, however, the final 
price cannot be determined until offers to buy the stock have been received, 
creating a catch-22. The SEC had previously issued no-action letters con­
cerning online auctions to Wit Capital, Hambrecht, and Bear Stearns.61 
Google moved forward with the auction, working closely with the SEC to 
establish systems for ( 1) setting the price through indications of interest 
rather than binding bids, and (2) confirming bids after the registration 
statement was declared effective. 
The size of Google's offering forced a difficult decision early on. Most 
companies that conduct auctions do so through Hambrecht, the auction pio­
neer. Hambrecht has an infrastructure in place to handle auction IPOs. 
Google was concerned, however, that their offering needed more assistance 
from traditional underwriters, who can reach out to institutional investors. 
Google retained Hambrecht to advise on the offering but chose the more 
traditional investment banks Morgan Stanley and CSFB to lead the syndi­
cate. Some viewed the choice of investment banks as a missed opportunity 
to further egalitarian reform of the IPO process.62 
PR for the deal took a hit when the investment banks made access to the 
deal somewhat difficult for individual investors. To ensure that bids were 
serious, the banks required that investors have high minimum account bal­
ances to make a bid. Rumors circulated that some banks required minimum 
account balances of half a million dollars. The auction would not be as 
egalitarian as initially promised. Google responded by expanding the syndi­
cate to include smaller firms, including E*TRADE, some of which required 
minimum balances as low as $2,000.63 
The next hurdle concerned the issue of insider selling. Traditionally, un­
derwriters ask insiders to agree not to sell any stock within 180 days of the 
initial offering. Google had no such agreement in place, and analysts began 
to question whether insider selling would put excessive pressure on the 
stock price immediately following the offering. Eventually, the founders and 
venture capitalists cut back on the number of shares they would sell in the 
initial offering, and management agreed to a waterfall-style lockup agree­
ment, with increasing numbers of shares sold after 15,  90, 120, 1 50, and 1 80 
days. 
Google's road show brought acrimony from analysts as well. Investors 
complained that Google disclosed little information about the company's 
plans. Mary Meeker, a high profile analyst, complained that she had never 
dealt with a company as unhelpful as Google. Institutional investors accus­
tomed to receiving favored treatment had little advantage over any small 
investor with a computer. 
6 1 .  Hurt, supra note 33, at 8; Bear, Stearns & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 
1013584 (July 20, 2000); W.R. Hambrecht & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 987735 (July 
1 2, 2000); Wit Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1013585 (July 20, 2000); Wit Capi­
tal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 49854 (July 1 4, 1 999). 
62. See Hurt, supra note 33. 
63. Id. at 14. 
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The deal was delayed into August, bringing yet more trouble. The buzz 
started to fade; August is a slow month on Wall Street, as bankers and trad­
ers depart for Nantucket, Martha's Vineyard, or the Hamptons. Things got 
even worse on August 1 2, when an issue of Playboy magazine reached the 
newsstands; the timing could not have been worse. The magazine had 
printed an interview with Brin and Page talking about the company. Publica­
tion of the article arguably violated the gun-jumping rules, which companies 
often address by halting the IPO process and "cooling off." Google managed 
to keep the process moving by filing yet another amendment to the registra­
tion statement, reprinting the article in full, and disclosing the risk in the 
prospectus.64 Google then disclosed that it had failed to register certain 
shares received by service providers, potentially violating SEC rules. The 
bidding process finally began on August 13 .  Demand appeared soft, and 
Google lowered its price target from $108-135 to $85-95 a share. To Wall 
Street insiders, Google was beginning to look amateurish, not innovative. 
The auction finally closed, and Google sold the stock to the underwriters 
at $85 per share, who then distributed it to the bidders. Successful bidders 
(i.e., anyone who bid over $85) were allocated 75% of their requested 
shares, suggesting that Google intentionally left some money on the table to 
ensure a positive first-day close and compensate those bidders who had 
stuck it out. The stock closed its first day of trading at $100, in line with the 
historical underpricing average of 18%.  
In sum, the deal did not go altogether swimmingly. Wall Street resented 
having to accept an innovative deal structure that weakened the control and 
importance of the underwriters. Institutional investors may have invested 
less effort in investigating the company, resulting in lower bids. Stock­
market pundit Jim Cramer explained: 
The "go it alone" method that Google used was a total fiasco, just ridicu­
lous. The arrogance, the incompetence was beyond belief. Their own 
missteps and misbehavior have brought much lower prices than they ever 
would have gotten for the deal. Institutions, mutual funds and hedge funds 
all are boycotting the deal. So the price will be artificially low. These guys 
will have totally messed it up for themselves.65 
It is hard to disagree with Cramer's conclusion that Google left money 
on the table. But in hindsight, with Google now trading near $400, and hav­
ing successfully completed a $4 billion. follow-on offering, I 'm not sure it's 
fair to say that the Google guys "totally messed it up for themselves." 
64. If the magazine article violated the gun-jumping rules, investors would constructively 
acquire a put option (an option to sell the stock back to Google at the offering price) along with the 
Google shares. This may help explain the underpricing of the deal, as the underpricing moves the 
strike price of this constructive put option out of the money. As long as the price of Google remains 
above the offering price, in other words, the Playboy article isn't a problem, as no shareholder 
would want to exercise its remedy by selling the stock back to the company at the low offering 
price. By lowering the offering price, underpricing thus serves as an (expensive) method of insur­
ance against gun-jumping liability. 
65. James J. Cramer, How to Buy Google: After the Deal, REALMONEY.COM, Aug. 1 8, 2004, 
quoted in Hurt, supra note 33, at 23. 
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Whether the deal was successful depends on the metric one uses to measure 
success. 
4. Evaluating the Deal: Efficiency 
Few would characterize the Google IPO as efficient. It is difficult to 
know what would have happened if Google had instead used the traditional 
book-building method. The unusual deal structure certainly drove up legal 
fees. Google paid its underwriters a 3% commission, well below the indus­
try standard 7-8%, but its ability to drive down investment-banking fees 
came primarily from its market power, not its selection of an auction proc­
ess. It seems likely the company could have raised more money had it used 
the traditional IPO process. Following the IPO, institutional investors rushed 
to buy the stock, pushing the price higher and higher. 
Jim Cramer is not alone in thinking that the offering price would have 
been higher if Google had done a traditional IPO. The central problem faced 
by IPO issuers is the information asymmetry between the issuer and poten­
tial buyers. Issuers overcome this problem by disclosing information and by 
renting the reputation of financial intermediaries.66 Google did a poor job on 
both counts. They were tight-lipped about the company, disclosing little in­
formation other than the basic financial information and risk factors 
required by the SEC. The founders' letter, while entertaining, was short on 
useful insight about the company's plans. As far as renting reputation, 
Google hired Morgan Stanley and CSFB to lead the syndicate. But even 
here, Google showed little interest in gathering up the support of intermedi­
aries. After Google slashed fees, Merrill Lynch walked away from the deal. 
While Google did receive the implicit endorsement of the many banks that 
remained in the syndicate, the ill will it generated by slashing fees may have 
reduced selling efforts. Moreover, auctions are associated with less under­
pricing, removing an incentive for institutional investors who might 
otherwise have gotten involved. And without the firm promise of under­
priced shares, the underwriters had little financial incentive to push the stock 
on their favored clients. 
In sum, the post-IPO run-up in Google's stock price suggests that the 
deal structure may indeed have left money on the table. Without a clear 
promise of underpricing and no possibility of a favorable allocation even if 
they did participate, institutional investors had little reason to investigate the 
company. It cost them very little to wait until the stock began trading on the 
secondary market. The run-up in the stock price thus may have been caused 
by the inability of the auction process to reduce the information asymmetry 
between Google and its potential investors. Post-IPO events and 
66. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakrnan, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 
VA. L. REv. 549 (1984). 
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announcements may have contributed to the run-up in the stock price, but it 
is hard to imagine such events accounting for the full increase.67 
5. Evaluating the Deal: Branding Effects 
Despite these apparent flaws in both design and execution, the Google 
IPO should be considered a success. The IPO was not just a financing trans­
action; it was a branding moment. It generated benefits for Google outside 
the four comers of the prospectus.68 Each story in the business press was a 
love letter to customers who value corporate integrity. From a corporate­
finance perspective, the deal was at best mediocre. From a marketing per­
spective, it was simply brilliant. 
Google, more than most, needs a good brand image to ensure long-term 
success. Marketing theory helps explain why this is so. Products may be 
categorized as search goods, experience goods, and credence goods.69 
Search goods are goods for which consumers may easily assess quality be­
fore purchase, like clothing or furniture. Experience goods are goods for 
which consumers may easily assess quality after purchase, like a haircut or a 
lawnmower. Credence goods are goods for which quality is difficult to as­
sess even after purchase, like financial advice, auto repair, or education. 
Branding is especially important for experience goods and credence 
goods. Google's search engine is an experience good.7° For such goods, 
branding is a way for a seller to commit to product attributes that are diffi­
cult for third parties (such as courts) to verify.7 1 The search engine and other 
Google products might even be considered credence goods. Consumers 
would find it difficult to verify the quality of search results, even after exam­
ining the results, unless they also sampled other search engines. In theory, 
consumers could spend a few hours running experiments, trying out differ­
ent searches on each site and comparing results. Few consumers, however, 
are so diligent. Comparing results, moreover, is not so easy. Only with care­
ful inspection can one figure out which sites, deep in the results, one search 
engine discovered and another did not. Often the relevance of results is not 
67. The auction structure may also have encouraged a post-IPO increase in revenue by 
spreading ownership of the stock out more broadly. Search engines have network effects, and broad­
based stock ownership may nudge investors to use Google. I am indebted to Bruce Johnsen for 
identifying this point. 
68. A more formal way of stating this idea is to consider the positive externalities of the IPO. 
Some economists have noted the effect. See, e.g. , Alexander Ljungqvist, !PO Underpricing: A Sur­
vey, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 
forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at I ,  on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=609422 ("The act of going public itself shines a spotlight on the company, and the atten­
dant publicity may bring indirect benefits, such as attracting a different caliber of manager."). 
69. Fleischer, supra note 1 1 . 
70. See I.P.L. Png & David Reitman, Why Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 
J.L. & EcoN. 207, 209 (1995) ("[S]ellers are more likely to brand when consumers find personal 
search and experimentation relatively unattractive."). 
7 1 .  See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contrac­
tual Performance, 89 J. PoL. EcoN. 6 1 5  (198 1 ). 
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apparent without clicking through. Rather than experiment with different 
products, consumers rely on word-of-mouth and brand image. 
Other search engines and Internet portals, like Ask.com, Yahoo! and 
America Online spend lavishly on advertising to convey a sense of relevance 
or usefulness to consumers. Google's branding strategy, on the other hand, 
is subtle. It relies on the diffusion of buzz through informal networks. It has 
a blog targeted at early adopters72 that introduces and discusses new prod­
ucts. Because Google derives most of its profits from advertising revenue, it 
can give away most of its products and services for free, relying on users to 
pass along knowledge to friends, family, and colleagues. 
Google is well aware of both the importance of its brand and the chal­
lenges it faces in enhancing and protecting the brand. The risk-factor section 
of the S-3 to their recent follow-on offering explains that the business "de­
pends on a strong brand." Google notes that its management of information 
raises privacy concerns, making the integrity of the brand that much more 
important.73 Litigation involving Google is high profile, and as the legal is­
sues get resolved, Google must also win in the court of public opinion.74 
The IPO structure enhanced Google's brand image in several ways. 
Playfalness and Geek Humor. The name Google derives from a mathe­
matical term, Googol, which means the numeral one followed by 100 
zeros.75 From a branding perspective, "Google" appears at first glance to be 
an arbitrary word, like Apple or BlackBerry, with no obvious tie-in to the 
company. It also conveys playfulness, however, and tells an inside joke 
known to mathematicians. The mathematics tie-in is not deeply hidden, 
however. Instead, it's just hidden enough to trigger questions from business 
reporters, who then convey the clue to the public, letting them in on the 
joke. The name also conveys a functional meaning: Google can search large 
72. On early adopters, see generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LIT­
TLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE ( !st paperback ed. 2002), and EVERETT M. ROGERS, 
DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (5th ed. 2003). 
73. Google explains that "people have raised privacy concerns relating to the ability of our 
Gmail email service to w:itch relevant ads to the content of email messages. In addition, some indi­
viduals and organizations have raised objections to our scanning of copyrighted materials from 
library collections for use in our Google Print product." Google, Inc. Registration Statement (Form 
S-3), at 9 (Aug. 18,  2005). 
74. See A Taxing Blog, http://vic.typepad.com/taxingblog/2005/06/googles_copyrig.html 
(June 30, 2005); Posting of Brad Hill to the Unofficial Google Weblog, 
http://google.weblogsinc.com/entry/1234000483056521 (Aug. 29, 2005). 
75. The company website explains: 
Google is a play on the word googol, which was coined by Milton Sirotta, nephew of Ameri­
can mathematician Edward Kasner, and was popularized in the book, Mathematics and the 
Imagination by Kasner and James Newman. It refers to the number represented by the numeral 
I followed by JOO zeros. Google's use of the term reflects the company's mission to organize 
the immense, seemingly infinite amount of information available on the web. 
Google Corporate Information: Google Milestones, http://www.google.com/corporate/history.html 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2006). 
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numbers of sites-a googol sites, perhaps-and offer the user the most rele­
vant hits.76 
The playfulness extended to the IPO. A story in Wired entitled "More 
Reasons to Love Google" explained that the amount of money that Google 
sought to raise, $2,7 1 8,281,828, was a bit of "geek humor."77 2.7 1828 1828 is 
the mathematical constant e, or Euler's number, which is the base of the 
natural-logarithm function.78 
Google continued winking at the nerds in its follow-on offering in Au­
gust 2005, selling 14, 1 59,265 shares. The number represents the first eight 
digits after the decimal in the mathematical constant pi.79 Other examples of 
Google's math humor include the numbering of its buildings in Mountain 
View, which include Buildings phi (also known as the golden mean or 
golden ratio), e, and pi.8c The numbering systems of the buiidings and the 
stock offerings also pay homage to Donald Knuth, a professor in the Stan­
ford Computer Science Department (where Sergey and Larry met). Knuth's 
TEX program has versions 3. 1 ,  3. 14, 3. 141  and so on, and his METAFONT 
has versions 2.7, 2.7 1 ,  2.718, and so on.81 
And the auction process itself, of course, is interesting, fun, and intrigu­
ing. It is a technologically savvy way to gather and manage information. 
Instead of websites or web-maps, the information gathered and managed in 
the IPO was the price and allocation preferences of thousands of investors. 
Google IPO, like Google Search, Google Maps, and Google Talk, became 
not just a transaction but a technologically-appealing method of managing 
information. 
It would be quite a struggle to explain these choices-particularly the 
number of shares-with an unbranded, pure efficiency rationale. Like a 
monkey typing the collected works of Shakespeare, an investment-banking 
analyst given an infinite number of hours could eventually come up with a 
model that generates the eight digits of pi after the decimal point as the op­
timal number of shares. But the real story, of course, is about branding. The 
founders, it seems, recognize that the amount of money raised in an offering 
is somewhat arbitrary (at least within a range-notice that Google did not 
offer 3 1 .4 million or 3. 1 million shares). Instead of picking a round number, 
Google seized the moment to show the world how nerds conduct an IPO. 
76. See Google Corporate Information: Company Overview, http://www.google.com/ 
corporate/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
77. Cf Top ln(eAIO) Reasons Why e Is Better Than Pi, http://www.mu.org/-doug/exp/ 
etoplO.htmJ (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
78. See BATIELLE, supra note 34, at 2 1 7  ("By manipulating the actual offering to provide 
this knowing wink to nerd humor, Google was in effect declaring: the geeks are in control."). 
79. Word of mouth spread the math joke quickly around Wall Street. Interview with Scott 
Pintoff, General Counsel, GFI Group, Inc. (Aug. 1 8, 2005). 
80. Michael Kanellos, Gwyneth, the Grateful Dead and Google, ZDNET AUSTRALIA, July 
28, 2003, http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/business/soa/Gwyneth_the_Grateful_Dead_and_Google/ 
0,39023 1 66,20276597 ,00.htm. I am indebted to Bernard Eskandari for this observation. 
8 1 .  Donald E. Knuth, The Future of TEX and METAFONT, http://www.ntg.nl/maps/ 
pdf/5_34.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). I am indebted to Paul Ohm for this observation. 
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Integrity. Most search engines and Internet portals are cluttered with 
links, ads, and promotions. The main Google search page, on the other hand, 
is mostly white space. Other than a few barebones links and the playful "I'm 
Feeling Lucky" button, the site concentrates on helping the user. The search 
results page is similarly clean. There are no pop-up ads or advertising banners. 
Google does not distort its search results, instead setting aside its Spon­
sored Links in a separate sidebar and in a box across the top. It does not 
engage in "search engine payola."82 Google's website explains, 
Advertising on Google is always clearly identified as a "Sponsored Link." 
It is a core value for Google that there be no compromising of the integrity 
of our results. We never manipulate rankings to put our partners higher in 
our search results. No one can buy better PageRank. Our users trust 
Google's objectivity and no short-term gain could ever justify breaching 
that trust.83 
Not all consumers care about payola as a matter of principle, but to the 
extent payola distorts the search results that the algorithm would otherwise 
generate, payola matters. And Google's approach is refreshing. Its consis­
tency with respect to integrity issues makes PageRartk credible despite its 
relative lack of transparency.84 
The Auction IPO enhanced Google's brand image by solidifying its 
reputation as being more concerned with integrity than insider profits. Dot­
com founders became millionaires by cashing in on IPOs.85 Google's foun­
ders are billionaires, but their choice of deal structure reflects little desire to 
cash in quickly at the expense of long-term shareholders. 
Egalitarianism. Google presents an image of being democratic and non­
elitist. Google Search is freely available without a fee or even registration. 
Basic versions of fancier applications like Google Maps, Google Print, and 
82. Compare Posting of Victor Fleischer to Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/ 
2005/08/search_engine_p.html (Aug. 9, 2005), with Posting of Joshua Wright to Conglomerate, 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/08/google_and_sear.html (Aug. 8, 2005). See generally 
Ronald Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 269 ( 1 979). 
83. Google Corporate Information: Our Philosophy, http://www.google.com/corporate/ 
tenthings.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
84. Integrity is especially important for Google as it grows. Market research shows that a 
corporate image strategy can affect corporate credibility and increase the acceptance of brand exten­
sions. See KEVIN L. KELLER, STRATEGIC BRAND MANAGEMENT: BUILDING, MEASURING, AND 
MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 546 (2d ed. 2003); Kevin L. Keller & David A. Aaker, The Effects of 
Sequential Introduction of Brand Extensions, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 35-50 ( 1 992). A company with 
an innovative corporate image is viewed as an expert in the area. Research also shows that innova­
tive companies are also seen as trustworthy and likable. A brand image of credibility may be 
especially important for high-tech companies, because the products themselves change quickly over 
time. A leading marketing professor explains that in "a high-tech setting, trustworthiness also relates 
to consumers' perceptions of the firm's longevity and staying power. With technology companies, 
the president or CEO often is a key component of the brand and performs an important brand­
building and communication function, in some cases as an advocate of the technology involved." 
Keller, supra, at 741 . 
85. The self-satisfied greed of the era was captured in the documentary Startup.com, in 
which one manager refers to himself as a "lowly millionaire," as contrasted with the company's 
founders, who would become billionaires. See STARTUP.COM (Live/Artisan 2001 ). 
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Google Earth are free. Even on the revenue-producing side, Google main­
tains an egalitarian bent. The cost of creating an account for Google's 
AdWords service is only five dollars, and there is no minimum ad expendi-. d 86 ture require . 
The prospectus materials suggest that this egalitarian image was impor­
tant to Google. Consider two examples. First, the founders' letter, originally 
planned to appear at the front of the prospectus, raised a predictable objec­
tion from the SEC over the concern that, by departing from the standard 
form, the prospectus might confuse investors. The founders felt it was worth 
the battle. Second, Google fought the SEC over whether it could refer to the 
founders and the CEO on a first-name basis, even as it conceded other is­
sues.87 The SEC found the informality objectionable. Google ultimately won 
the battle and was permitted both to include the founders' letter and to refer 
to Eric, Sergey, and Larry on a first-name basis in the prospectus. 
The auction pricing mechanism also played into this idealistic image. 
Rather than having underwriters set the price using the traditional book­
building method, investors set the price for shares over the Internet. The 
voice of the people, not Wall Street insiders, set the price. The deal structure 
eliminated the favoritism problems that accompany the traditional process 
and gathered information in an evenhanded manner. 
The press ate it up. A Wall Street Journal article, Google 's Dutch Treat, 
noted the fit between the IPO and Google's business model: "In a sense, this 
auction is the perfect IPO expression of Google's own business model. The 
company's success has derived from its ability to democratize access to in­
formation via the Internet, and its auction will likewise open its shares to a 
wide spectrum of investors."88 
That sort of PR can't be bought. 
Internal Branding. Internal branding is the process of ensuring that em­
ployees embrace the brand and what it represents.89 Branding can have an 
effect not just on customers, but on employees. Branding, in other words, is 
more than marketing.90 
For a company that relies on intellectual capital, internal branding is es­
pecially important.91 The auction structure fed into Google's nonconformist 
style.92 The company calls its headquarters the Googleplex, and it is de-
86. Google Corporate Information: Quick Profile, http://www.google.com/corporate/ 
facts.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
87. Verne Kopytoff, How SEC Held Search Engine 's Feet to the Fire in Its /PO Filing: 
Lengthy Give-and-Take Unfolds in Letters with Regulators, S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug. 14, 2005, at B I .  
88. Editorial, Google 's Dutch Treat, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2004, at A20. 
89. See KELLER, supra note 84, at 156. 
90. See LYNN B .  UPSHAW & EARL L. TAYLOR, THE MASTERBRAND MANDATE: THE MAN­
AGEMENT STRATEGY THAT UNIFIES COMPANIES AND MULTIPLIES VALUE, at ix (2000) (noting that 
branding tends to be compartmentalized as solely a marketing tool). 
9 1 .  NICHOLAS IND, LIVING THE BRAND: How TO TRANSFORM EVERY MEMBER OF YOUR 
ORGANIZATION INTO A BRAND CHAMPION 50-80 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the importance of values 
to organizations). 
92. See BATTELLE, supra note 34, at 2 15. 
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scribed as an open, informal space. Employees can bring their dogs to work. 
Google touts its corporate culture as collegial, flexible, and collaborative. 
Google's website highlights the use of rubber exercise balls as office chairs 
and the hiring of Charlie Ayers, former chef to the Grateful Dead, as com­
pany chef. 
6. The Branding Power of Auctions 
Google is not alone in using the auction structure as a branding opportu­
nity.93 Other companies that have completed auctions include redEnvelope, 
Peet's, Salon.com, Overstock.com, Morningstar, and Ravenswood. The pat­
tern suggests that companies that brand themselves as contrarian, 
egalitarian, and user-oriented are more likely to conduct auc.tion IPOs.94 The 
auction structure appears to be useful for cult brands (those seeking a de­
voted customer base and quirky or counterculture brand association) and 
integrity brands (companies whose business model depends on transparency 
or trust).95 
Ravenswood Winery and Peet's Coffee and Tea are examples of cult 
brands.96 Cult companies often position themselves in opposition to the 
market leaders. Google is anti-Microsoft. Apple is anti-Microsoft. Whole 
Foods97 and Trader Joe's are cult brands positioning themselves opposite 
legacy supermarkets like Albertson's, Kroger, Safeway, and Ralph's. Peet's 
Coffee and Tea is the anti-Starbucks.98 Ravenswood Winery, with its motto 
"No Wimpy Wines," pushed red zinfandel and cultivates a contrarian brand 
image.99 Other examples of specialty companies using an auction process to 
93. Finance scholars have noted the possibility that underpricing may enhance branding. 
Evidence is mixed. Larry L. DuCharme, Shivaram Rajgopal & Stephan E. Sefcik, Lowballing for 
"Pop ": The Case of Internet /PO Underpricing 5 (Jan. 2001 )  (working paper on file with author), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=257725 (finding a strong associa­
tion between media hype and underpricing, but also finding "mixed" evidence of a branding effect, 
specifically finding that although underpricing is higher for business-to-consumer (B2C) firms, sales 
increases post-IPO are not significantly related to the extent of underpricing). 
94. A complete list is available at WR Hambrecht + Co: Auctions and Offerings, http:// 
www.openipo.com/ind/auctions/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006). 
95. See MICHAEL LEVINE, A BRANDED WORLD: ADVENTURES IN PUBLIC RELATIONS AND 
THE CREATION OF SUPERBRANDS 107 (2003) (discussing "soul branding," or the notion that compa­
nies that appeal to the soul will eventually dominate the market, as a growing contingency of 
consumers are willing to pay a bit more for a product if it helps a worthy cause). 
96. Peet's used the auction process for a follow-on offering, not its IPO. The company went 
public in 2001 , before Hambrecht had tried out the OpenIPO system. 
97. Whole Foods did a traditional IPO. Other Whole Foods deals, however, reflect sensitivity 
to branding concerns. For example, it refuses to accept slotting fees (the fees that retailers charge 
manufacturers for product placement and shelf space). 
98. Cf AUSTIN POWERS: THE SPY WHO SHAGGED ME (New Line Cinema 1 999). Peel's, 
ironically enough, was the original owner of the Starbucks brand. It started as the "Starbuck's Cof­
fee Company" in 1 97 1  before acquiring Peet's Coffee and Tea in 1 984. It sold its Seattle-based 
assets, including the Starbucks brand, to II Giomale coffee company in 1 987. PEET's COFFEE & 
TEA, PROSPECTUS 30-3 1 (2002), available at http://www.openipo.com/tradfo/peet/20020419.pdf. 
99. Ravenswood does not go so far as to push white zin. No one is that daring. 
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distribute stock include Salon.com (a nontraditional media outlet) and 
redEnvelope (an online gift retailer). 
Overstock.com is an example of a company that seeks a savvy, knowl­
edgeable consumer base. The company is an online outlet-shopping site that 
specializes in liquidating excess inventory through direct Internet sales. It 
also has an online auction branch. Its founder, Patrick Byrne, reported that 
he received little interest from venture capitalists and viewed the traditional 
IPO process with skepticism.100 The Overstock.com website includes an un­
usual letter to stockholders that stresses transparency and integrity and 
explains Overstock's conservative accounting.'°' 
Morningstar is an example of an "integrity" company providing a cre­
dence good to savvy consumers. Morningstar is a financial-services 
company that provides services to individuals, advisors, and institutions. 
The brand is one of the most recognized and respected in the investment 
industry. A traditional IPO-with its associations with underpricing, favored 
allocations, and insider profiteering�ould have undermined the Morning­
star brand image. Morningstar emphasized its commitment to integrity in its 
IPO prospectus: it noted that it would not provide guidance to analysts (be­
cause of the inherent conflict it presents to management's personal financial 
interest) and that it voluntarily expensed its stock options on the income 
statement. '°2 
Conclusion. It is difficult to measure the effect the deal structure had on 
Google's brand equity. But the evidence suggests that from a branding per­
spective, the deal was successful. Google's CEO has publicly speculated 
that publicity surrounding the IPO-no doubt attributable in part to the un­
usual deal structure-may have boosted revenues in that quarter. '°3 By 
boosting revenues and increasing brand equity, the apparent dichotomy be­
tween branding and efficiency disappears. While the auction IPO may not 
have produced the maximum share price possible, it may have helped boost 
revenue, which in tum supports Google's current share price. 
B. Ben & Jerry 's Homemade, Inc. 
The Google IPO, while innovative, was not the first deal to blend Wall 
Street finance with Main Street values. When Ben & Jerry's went public in 
1984, it sold its stock directly to customers, employees, and friends, limiting 
the offering to Vermont residents. Smaller companies occasionally use direct 
public offerings, or DPOs, to go public. In a direct public offering, a com-
100. The Charlie Rose Show (PBS Television broadcast Mar. 1 1 ,  2005). 
l 0 I .  Overstock.com, CEO Letter to Owners, http://www.shareholder.com/overstock/owners. 
cfm (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). 
102. MORNINGSTAR, PROSPECTUS FOR INITIAL PuBLIC OFFERING OF COMMON STOCK 27 
(2005), available at http://www.openipo.com/ind/auctions/openipo/morn/morn20050502.pdf. 
103. Paul Kedrosky's Infectious Greed, http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/001570.html (July 
2 1 ,  2005) (quoting Google CEO Eric Schmidt as noting that the third quarter of 2004 was particu­
larly strong for Google "because of improvements in our ability to monetize traffic and perhaps 
because of the publicity surrounding our IPO approximately a year ago."). 
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pany raises capital by marketing its stock directly to customers, employees, 
friends, and family, without the help of an underwriter. Following the offer­
ing, the stock trades over-the-counter, if at all. DPOs do double duty for the 
small companies that employ them. Besides raising capital, they bond the 
consumer to the company. 104 Ben & Jerry's coupled this direct-marketing 
strategy with a rarely used exception to the securities laws for intrastate of­
ferings. By selling stock directly to customers, and by limiting the 
geographic distribution to Vermont, Ben & Jerry's cleverly and carefully 
designed a way of raising money that, although not necessarily achieving 
the lowest cost of capital, furthered other goals. 
The story of how "two real guys" from Vermont opened their first scoop 
shop on the site of an old gas station in Burlington, Vermont is quite farnil­
iar. 105 Ben & Jerry's is often held out as a paragon of social responsibility. 106 
Cynics might dismiss the Ben & Jerry's brand image as little more than a 
marketing ploy; today, Ben & Jerry's is owned by Unilever, a multinational 
conglomerate. But whatever the current state of the brand, it is indisputable 
that for many years Ben & Jerry's made the most of their unusual, powerful 
brand image. This Section explores how the deal structure the company used 
back in 1984 contributed to the ubiquitous image in our minds of aging, 
contented hippies eating ice cream. 
1 .  Vermonters-Only 
Ben & Jerry's went public in 1984. The founders, Ben Cohen and Jerry 
Greenfield, needed investment capital to build a new factory in Waterbury, 
Vermont. The founders already saw the factory as more than a factor of pro­
duction: it would be built close to the ski resort in Stowe and its attendant 
tourist traffic. The company could not borrow enough money to build the 
factory. They needed equity. Bankers advised the two to seek venture 
capital. 107 The founders chose to do a public offering instead. In and of itself, 
the decision to raise money from the public rather than venture capitalists is 
1 04. Mark Kollar, Do-It-Yourself Public Offerings, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Mar. 24, 
1997, at 1 5  (discussing Ben & Jerry's and other DPOs and noting that a company must have a 
"built-in fan club" that wants to be a part of the business). " 'People become better customers when 
they are part owners . . . .  This also enhances the marketing of the product and services.' " Id. (quot­
ing Drew Field, a securities lawyer in San Francisco). 
1 05. B EN COHEN & JERRY GREENFIELD, BEN & JERRY'S DOUBLE-DIP: How TO RUN A VAL­
UES-LED BUSINESS AND MAKE MONEY, Too (1997). The Ben & Jerry's brand image has arguably 
been overplayed. Two Ben & Jerry-like characters are parodied in an episode of the Simpsons, in 
which Homer encounters two hippies running a juice business. Homer concludes, "I guess the juice 
business is more important than the ideals our hippie forefathers refused to go to war and die for." 
The Simpsons: TV.com, D'oh-in in the Wind Summary, http://www.tv.com/simpsons/doh-in-in-the­
wind/episode/1 494/summary.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). The episode also pokes fun at the 
founders of Nantucket Nectars, the "Juice Guys." Id. ; see also Nantucket Nectars, The Company, 
http://www.juiceguys.com/thecompany.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
1 06. E.g., Ralph Nader, Legislating Corporate Ethics, 30 J .  LEGIS. 1 93, 1 97 (2004). 
1 07. FRED LAGER, BEN & JERRY'S: THE INSIDE Scoop 91 ( 1994) ("The bankers said Ben's 
proposal to sell stock only to Vermonters was 'naive and impractical' . . . .  Everyone politely sug­
gested that venture capital was the way to go."). 
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not so surprising; venture financing would have resulted in a substantial loss 
of control, including control over the commitment to social responsibility 
the founders valued so highly. What made the offering unusual was that 
stock was offered directly to investors without the help of an underwriter, 
and it was offered only to Vermont residents. 
Local interest in the offering was initially scant. 108 The founders were 
frustrated by the need to complete a prospectus, which was required under 
state law notwithstanding the federal securities-law exemption. The foun­
ders and managers patiently plugged the company in a Burlington-only 
"road show" at a local hotel, night after night. The company priced the of­
fering cheap, at $ 1 0.50 a share, with a minimum purchase of just twelve 
shares. Demand eventually picked up, and the offering successfully closed. 
The company raised enough equity capital to secure additional government 
loans and grants, and they built the new factory in Waterbury. As explained 
below, the company may have left money on the table by limiting the poten­
tial purchasers of their stock to Vermont residents. But the offering allowed 
the company to accomplish other goals: it protected the integrity and iden­
tity of the company. 
Ben & Jerry's Homemade did not stay a Vermont-only operation for 
long. The company followed up the Vermont-only offering with a NASDAQ 
offering just one year later, providing liquidity to shareholders and addi­
tional capital to the growing company. 109 The company continued to grow 
throughout the late ' 80s and ' 90s. Its return to stockholders was mediocre, 
however, and the company attracted takeover bids. Unilever, a European 
food-and-consumer-goods conglomerate, acquired the company in 2000 at 
$43.60 per share, nearly a 1 00% premium to the trading price. Unilever cre­
ated a separate board of directors to run the company, to maintain the 
company's social mission and, presumably, to hold on to the brand image 
th 11 . f . 1 10 at se s so many pmts o ice cream. 
2. Costs and Benefits of the Geographic Restriction 
From a corporate-finance perspective, limiting the initial offering to 
Vermont residents seems inefficient. Institutional investors-mutual funds, 
foundations, pension funds, insurance companies--dominate the market for 
IPOs. Few of these institutions are incorporated in Vermont. Individuals, 
then, made up the vast majority of the buyers. Vermont has its share of 
108. Local coverage was matter-of-fact. E.g., Ben & Jerry's Offers Stock, RUTLAND DAILY 
HERALD, May 2, 1984, at 6. A former employee recollects some radio and news coverage. Email 
from Ben & Jerry's Consumer Services to Jennifer Locke (Sept. l ,  2005, 08:40 EST) (on file with 
author). 
109. Prior to the secondary offering, the company created a class of preferred stock, held by 
the charitable Ben & Jerry's Foundation, that would make a takeover more difficult. Susan Young­
wood, Ben and Jerry 's Stockholders Approve Common Stock Issue, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Oct. 
26, 1985, at 7A. 
1 10. This decision to create a separate board of directors can itself be viewed as an example 
of branding affecting deal structure. 
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wealthy individuals, but the geographic restriction had the foreseeable effect 
of limiting demand for the stock, which very likely pushed down the price at 
which the company was able to sell the stock. 1 1 1  Were there non-branding­
related factors that may have justified this seemingly irrational deal structure? 
Regulatory-cost engineering. From a transaction-cost engineering per­
spective, the geographic restriction makes little sense. From a regulatory 
perspective, however, the structure had a few advantages. Federal securities 
laws normally require a company offering securities to the public to file 
documents with the SEC and distribute materials to prospective investors. 
The Securities Act of 1933, however, has a narrow exemption for intrastate 
offerings. 1 12 The exemption does not render the securities law irrelevant; it 
only relieves issuers of the obligation to register the offering and deliver a 
prospectus. 1 1 3  Antifraud provisions still apply to intrastate offerings. 1 14 And 
Vermont laws protecting investors still applied to the transaction. As a re­
sult, Ben & Jerry's had to prepare an offering circular and prospectus. But it 
did not have to prepare audited financial statements going back in time, 
which would have been difficult for the disorganized company.1 1 5  
Avoiding federal registration produced some cost savings to Ben & 
Jerry's. "By not having to deal with the SEC," wrote Fred Lager, the com­
pany's General Manager, "we'd be able to save the tens of thousands of 
dollars in legal and accounting fees that would have been necessary in order 
to comply with the stricter securities laws that applied to any offering that 
crossed state lines."1 16 
The savings from reduced paperwork, however, may not have been 
worth the tradeoff, at least if one disregards the branding implications of the 
structure. By Fred Lager's possibly generous estimate, the company saved 
tens of thousands of dollars in legal and accounting fees. But this amount 
was likely offset by the additional money the company could have raised 
had they looked to non-Vermont residents. If, for example, by offering the 
stock nationally, the company had sold the stock at $ 1 1 .50 instead of $ 10.50 
per share, it would have raised an additional $73,500, presumably more than 
l 1 1 . This is actually a tricky point if resale out of state is permitted. 
1 1 2.  Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)( l l ), 1 5  U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)( l l) (2000); LoUis Loss & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 377-87 (5th ed. 2004) (discussing intra­
state offering exemption). See generally Daniel J. McCauley, Jr., Intrastate Securities Transactions 
under the Federal Securities Act, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 937 ( 1959). 
1 13 .  McCauley, supra note 1 12, at 939. 
1 14. Id. at 955-59. 
1 15 .  LAGER, supra note 107, at  93 ("A fully registered offering would also have required 
audited financial statements going back three years, which was something we didn't have."). 
1 16. Id. 
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offsetting the regulatory savings. 1 17 Reducing the company's cost of capital, 
however, did not seem to be the goal of the offering. 1 18 
Bonding with customers by making them investors. The founders wanted 
to strengthen the bond between the company and its local clientele and 
community. 1 19 Although the company had started to sell ice cream outside 
the state, most of its sales still came from Vermonters. Offering stock to 
Vermonters first was a way to underscore the company's early supporters. 
According to Lager, "[Ben's] conviction was that we were holding the busi­
ness in trust, and that we should give the people who had supported the 
company from its earliest days the first opportunity to profit from our suc­
cess."120 The small minimum investment of just twelve shares, or $ 1 26, 
reflects this goal. 1 2 1 "We wanted to make it available to all economic 
classes," Cohen told Inc. magazine in a 1 989 interview. 122 "We were seeking 
somewhat to redistribute wealth."123 
Ben's statement about redistributing wealth reflects a nai've view of in­
vesting. Access to an IPO does not necessarily redistribute wealth. An IPO 
is not a money machine. If the company had failed, access to the IPO would 
have cost Vermonters, not helped them. Offering stock to Vermonters re­
flects Ben's optimism, however. Vermonters who bought the stock did well 
for themselves. A share of stock purchased in 1984 for $10.50 would have 
been sold in 2000 to Unilever for $39 1 ,  adjusting for stock splits. 124 
Ben's lack of sophistication regarding investment risk should not be con­
fused with poor business judgment. Although going public created fiduciary 
duties to his new shareholders, Ben believed it could be a two-way street. 
Shareholders could work for him. The idea "was for the company to be 
owned by the same people who had lined up for scoops of ice cream at the 
1 1 7. BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE, INC., PROSPECTUS 1 (May 1 ,  1984) (on file with author) 
(showing number of shares offered at 73,500, with price to public at $ 10.50). 
1 1 8. LAGER, supra note 107, at 1 00  ("Our offering was directed at people who had never 
invested in stocks before. Most tombstones appear in the financial section. We were placing ours 
with the movie and TV listings."). 
1 19. Terry Minsky, The Entrepreneur: Scooping Up Cold Cash, ESQUIRE, March 1985, at 58 
(''The company went public last year, but Ben and Jerry have sold their stock only to residents of 
Vermont, as a way of thanking them for their help."); Gail Perrin, A Solid Success in Ice Cream, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 30, 1984, at 46 ("The company began offering shares to Vermont residents 
May I .  Ben emphasizes he made this decision 'because I really believe business has a responsibility 
to give back to the community.' "). 
120. LAGER, supra note 107, at 90. 
1 2 1 .  Ben & Jerry's Prospectus, supra note 1 17, at 25. 
1 22. Erik Larson, Forever Young: Ben and Jerry 's Quest to Keep Their Company's Spirit Alive 
as the Business Grows, INC., July 1988, at 50 (quoting Ben Cohen). 
123. Id. at 52 (quoting Ben Cohen). It is not self-evident, of course, that allowing Vermonters 
to purchase the stock necessarily redistributes wealth. Offering the stock only redistributes wealth if 
the insiders know that the company is worth more than the offering price per share; it seems likely 
that Cohen believed this, but could not know it for sure. 
1 24. Basis in the original shares was reduced to $ 1 . 1 7  by splits. Ben & Jerry's, Public Capi­
talization and Stock Split History, http://www.benjerry.com/our_company/research_library/financial 
_info/index.cfm#sec3 (last visited Mar. 5, 2006). 
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gas station."125 Customer-stockholders could add value in a way that faceless 
stockholders would not. 126 Potential stockholders were given ice cream at the 
road show. 121 The company also targeted the 1 985 secondary offering to cus­
tomers rather than institutional investors, although the offering was not 
limited to Vermont residents. The underwriter explained to a Vermont news­
paper, " 'We told Ben (Cohen, president and founder of Ben & Jerry's) that 
customers of Ben & Jerry's will have equal preference as customers of [the 
underwriter] .' "128 Observers estimated that by the mid- 1980s, one percent of 
Vermont residents owned stock in the company.129 
Still, the value added by having stockholders harangue their local Kwik­
E-Mart owners seems rather slim. Because each individual shareholder 
owned such a small percentage of the company, each one would have had 
little economic incentive to engage in the sort of watchdog behavior Ben 
touted. Perhaps some of this behavior occurred, especially in Burlington. 
But the real value of the intrastate offering wasn't  local. It was global. 
Branding. The unusual deal structure gave Cohen a chance to talk about 
the company with the business press, not just when the offering occurred in 
1 984, but for years afterwards. In interviews, Cohen highlighted the com­
munity-oriented nature of the company, and, much like Google, he stressed 
the founders' willingness to act independently from Wall Street. 130 The 
company ran advertisements in Vermont newspapers that read "Get a Scoop 
Id. 
1 25. LAGER, supra note 107, at 9 1 .  
1 26. Lager explains: 
Ben wanted the minimum investment to be $ 125. The investment bankers we'd talked to 
thought that lots of small stockholders would be an unnecessary financial burden, owing to the 
administrative costs. Ben saw advantages in having lots of shareholders. Like us, they could 
straighten out the pints in the supermarket freezers and bug the frozen-food clerk when the 
store didn't have Heath Bar Crunch in stock. 
1 27. Id. at IO I  ("The meetings would run about two hours, beginning with presentations from 
Ben and me and ending with a question-and-answer period during which we scooped ice cream. The 
ice cream freezer that we hauled around with us for the meetings was always prominently placed in 
the front of the room, to entice those who came to stay to the end."). 
1 28. Susan Youngwood, Ben & Jerry's Offers More Stock, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Sept. 1 8, 
1 985, at 4B (quoting Ned Morris, vice president at Tucker Anthony & R.L. Day Inc., the brokerage 
firm underwriting the offering). Friends of Phish Food, not Friends of Frank, had dibs. 
1 29. E.g., Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics 
by Modem Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1625, 
1 638 ( 1 993). 
1 30. Bruce Posner writes: 
By "Vermonters," moreover, Cohen did not mean a few well-heeled vacationers from New 
York and Boston. Quite the contrary. "We're very community-oriented," he says, "and I 
wanted to give typical Vermonters a chance to participate." So Cohen and his attorney ap­
proached the local offices of several regional and national underwriters to discuss the prospect 
of a $600,000 public equity offering for Vermont residents only. While some of the underwrit­
ers seemed intrigued, "nobody wanted to do an intrastate offering," reports Cohen. "Nor were 
they willing to do anything that small." 
Bruce G. Posner, A Scoop of the Action, INC., July 1984, at 1 23.  
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of the Action," inviting readers to request a copy of the prospectus. 131 In­
deed, some investors appeared to buy the stock as more of a memento than 
an investment. 132 For some holders, Ben & Jerry's stock was somewhat 
analogous to owning stock in the Green Bay Packers. 133 The cult of Ben & 
Jerry's was being built, stock certificate by stock certificate. 
The cult of Ben & Jerry's spread. The new factory lured the tourist 
trade. 134 "What better way to reinforce the image of 'Vermont's Finest,' " 
Lager explained, "than to offer people a taste of fresh ice cream right off the 
production line, in the shadow of the Green Mountains?"135 The factory was 
not an accidental tourist attraction; it was designed with precisely that goal 
in mind. The prospectus explained, ''The Company intends to organize plant 
tours ending in the Company's retail facility."136 The deal, as Calvin Trillin 
later noted, financed the plant "through a scheme that was well attuned to 
& 137 Ben Jerry's style." 
The IPO was not the only time Ben & Jerry exploited the branding im­
plications of legal events. The first time involved its chief super-premium 
ice cream competitor, Haagen-Dazs. Haagen-Dazs, despite the Scandinavian 
name, was an American company. Haagen-Dazs was founded by hardwork­
ing entrepreneur Reuben Mattus, and Pillsbury acquired the company in 
1983. 138 In the early 1 980s, Ben & Jerry's sued Haagen-Dazs concerning 
distribution to retailers. Seizing on the opportUnity to enhance its brand im­
age as a counterculture company, Ben & Jerry's played up its underdog 
status. They gave away T-shirts and bumper stickers that poked fun at the 
Pillsbury trademark. The shirts asked, "WHAT'S THE DOUGHBOY 
AFRAID OF?"139 They took out classified ads in Rolling Stone magazine. 140 
The company ran ten-second late-night television commercials in the New 
York area. Cohen told the New York Times, "We say, 'We might not be able 
1 3 1 .  Id. 
1 32. About a third of the investors purchased the minimum amount of shares, and a large 
number of shares were purchased by people in trust for their children or grandchildren. LAGER, 
supra note 107, at 103. 
1 33. Purchasers of Green Bay Packers common stock own a security that resembles common 
stock only in the most formal sense of the word. They cannot sell the stock or redeem the stock, nor 
are they entitled to dividends or proceeds on liquidation, nor do they have any meaningful voting 
rights. The stock is intended, in other words, to sit on the mantle and be passed down from one 
generation of Packers fans to the next. See generally Philip D. Drake & Mark D. Griffiths, Green 
Bay Packers, Inc., http://www.thunderbird.edu/pdf/about_us/case_series/a06980004.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2006). 
1 34. Will Lindner, Ben & Jerry's Stock Offering is Complete, RUTLAND DAILY HERALD, July 
4, 1984, at 7 (''The company hopes to build the 25,000-square-foot facility to increase production 
and lure the tourist trade."). 
1 35. LAGER, supra note 107, at 94. 
1 36. Ben & Jerry's Prospectus, supra note 1 17, at 6. 
1 37. Calvin Trillin, American Chronicles: Competitors, NEW YORKER, July 8, 1 985, at 43. 
1 38. Haagen-Dazs, Company History, http://www.haagen-dazs.com/coibrh.do (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2006). 
1 39. Charles P. Alexander, A Stock Scoop for lee Cream, TIME, Nov. 4, 1 985, at 59. 
140. Trillin, supra note 1 37, at 3 1 .  
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to afford a 30-second commercial but we sure make good ice cream.' And 
their battle with Hiiagen-Dazs, he added, shows that 'we can stand up to the 
big guys.' "141 The Times, of course, helped out by printing a story about the 
dispute. 
The antitrust claim was settled out of court. 142 A marketing professor de­
scribed Ben & Jerry's image as appealing to the "Reformed Hippy" 
market. 143 Calvin Trillin, writing in the New Yorker, explained that the geo­
graphical connection Ben & Jerry's tried to project "was not with the 
capitals of Europe but with rural Vermont." Trillin explains, "Times had 
changed. For the generation Ben and Jerry belonged to, the Continent had 
lost its cachet. Cachet had lost its cachet. Cohen and Greenfield were inter­
ested not simply in using natural ingredients but in being natural 
themselves."144 
By casting Hiiagen-Dazs as a villain, the campaign drew thousands of 
supporters and garnished substantial attention in the press. 145 The campaign 
had a serious side; the founders enlisted the white-shoe Boston firm of 
Ropes & Gray to pursue what they believed was a genuine antitrust viola­
tion. 146 Ben Cohen acknowledged, however, that he saw the campaign both 
as an attempt to expose corporate bullying and as publicity that might result 
in some ice-cream sales. 147 Hiiagen-Dazs's founder, meanwhile, viewed the 
campaign as an irritating but effective publicity stunt to avoid the hard work 
of elbowing one's way into a national market, as he had done himself as an 
entrepreneur. Trillin reported: " 'They got P.R. and exposure they couldn't 
buy for millions,' [Mattus] has said. 'What they did in a couple of years took 
me eighteen years to do. I did it the hard way.' "148 
3. A Scoop of the Action: Epilogue 
Ben & Jerry's deal gimmicks would pay dividends for years to come. 
Ben & Jerry's first placed stock in the same hands as consumers who ate the 
ice cream. 149 And when they succeeded, they both bonded with their current 
1 4 1 .  Vermont's Ice Cream Upstart, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1985, at D I .  
142. Id. 
143 .  Id. (quoting Dr. Meryl Gardner, assistant professor o f  Marketing at NYU). Not all o f  the 
media was eating the ice cream; one article in Forbes referred to the "sugar-laden, cholesterolly 
toxic products" as "yuppie porn," noting that the product is far more popular with "men in red sus­
penders" than inner-city residents, who would "need a bridge loan to take home a pint." Joe 
Queenan, Purveying Yuppie Porn, FORBES, Nov. 13,  1 989, at 60. 
144. Trillin, supra note 137, at 4 1 .  
145. Id. at 44 (citing a typical Jetter to Pillsbury as beginning, "CORPORATIONS LIKE 
YOURS REALLY MAKE ME SICK!"). 
146. Id. at 45. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. (quoting Reuben Mattus). 
149. Wendy Cooper writes: 
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customers and established a pattern for dealing with the company's financial 
issues. 150 A year later, when the company raised more funds through a more 
traditional secondary offering, they placed a "Scoop up our Stock" message 
on ice cream cartons, directing customers to a toll-free number to request a 
prospectus. 151 The unusual marketing drew attention from the press; in those 
interviews, the founders stressed the company's charitable work. 152 The fun 
would continue well into the 1 990s, whether it was picking ice cream fla­
vors or recruiting a CEO. 
Unilever, the current owner of the Ben & Jerry's brand, is a far cry from 
"two real guys" from Vermont. It is a multinational food-and-consumer­
products conglomerate, the world's second-largest food company and, ac­
cording to Professor Douglas Branson, illustrative of the challenge facing 
corporate social responsibility in an international context. 153 But through 
careful brand management, the Ben & Jerry's brand has largely survived. 
The mythology is powerful. The Vermont-only offering, while it left some 
money on the table, contributed to the cult. It was a wise investment. 
* * * 
Lawyers played a role in this production of the Ben & Jerry's cult, but 
not always a particularly constructive one. Lawyers fought the founders' 
urge to take the company public, and they fought the founders over the pro­
duction of information in the offering circular. Lager reports an interaction 
between the lawyers and the founders that will sound familiar to both: 
Ben [Cohen] and Allen [Martin, issuer's counsel] were approaching the 
circular from different perspectives. To the lawyers it was a disclosure 
document, intended to protect us from any suggestion of misleading inves­
tors in the event things didn't work out as well as we had projected. To Ben 
"The people we wanted to own our stock were the people eating our ice cream," explains Fred 
Lager, Ben & Jerry's general manager. Hence the direct pitch, which company co-founders 
Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield reinforced during the week before the offering by standing on 
Wall Street in blue jeans and T-shirts handing out free ice cream cones. 
Wendy Cooper, Investor Relations: Gimmicks, 1986, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1986, at 83. 
150. See Jim Schembari, Investors Bet Ben & Jerry 's ls Cream of Crop, CHI. SuN-TIMES, 
Nov. 1 0, 1985, at 4 (reporting on 1985 NASDAQ IPO, and quoting an underwriter as saying, "Half 
the issue eat the ice cream . . . .  Virtually no institutions bought the stock."). 
1 5 1 .  Alexander, supra note 1 39, at 59. 
1 52. Ice Cream Stock All Gone, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Nov. 7, 1985, at SC. Like Google, 
Ben & Jerry's marketing antics drew attention from the SEC. For the 1985 secondary offering, in 
addition to the "Scoop Up Our Stock" advertisements on ice cream cartons, Cohen's interview with 
1ime was published just two days before the offering became effective. The SEC investigated the 
offering but declined to comment on its findings. Junius Ellis, Why Initial Public Of erings Are Bad 
Bets, MONEY, April 1986, at 1 75. 
1 53.  Douglas M. Branson, The Social Responsibility of Large Multinational Corporations, 16 
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 121,  1 29-30 (2002). 
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i t  was a selling tool that h e  was going to have to rely o n  to persuade people 
to buy the stock. 154 
By the time Google tangled with the SEC twenty years later, its lawyers 
seemed much better attuned to the branding implications of the deal. Not 
only did its lawyers recognize the Google prospectus as a selling tool to in­
vestors, they recognized its value as a selling tool to consumers. 
But perhaps what was most remarkable about the Ben & Jerry's 1 984 
stock offering had nothing to do with corporate finance. What makes it re­
markable is what it did for dessert. By inviting the consumer to participate 
in corporate-governance issues, Ben & Jerry's changed the nature of buying 
• 155 ice cream. 
C. Apple 
IPOs are not the only branding opportunities for companies. I tum now 
to executive compensation, and the contract between an unusual company, 
Apple, and its CEO, Steve Jobs. 
1 .  One Dollar 
Steve Jobs and Steven Wozniak founded Apple Computer in the late 
1 970s. The Apple II computer became widely popular in the late 1970s; by 
1 980 the company had several thousand employees. Jobs focused his atten­
tion on the user-friendly Macintosh computer, which was released in 1 984. 
During the third quarter of the Super Bowl that year, Apple aired a sixty­
second commercial introducing the Macintosh. 156 The commercial, directed 
by Ridley Scott (who had recently finished Blade Runner), depicted the Or­
wellian IBM world shattered by the new, friendly Mac. Apple's brand image 
was established. Jobs left the company in 1985 over strategic disagreements 
with the company's CEO. Apple then struggled for years. 
1 54. LAGER, supra note 107, at 97-98; see also id. at 98 (noting that in a prior case dealing 
with a dispute over distribution of the ice cream, "Ben had deferred to his lawyer's advice. This time 
around, he wasn't willing to assume that the 'experts' knew everything and that his input wasn't of 
equal value."). 
1 55. One scholar has gone so far as to call Ben & Jerry's the first postmodern ice cream cone. 
Referring specifically to the marketing of Ben & Jerry's Rainforest Crunch ice cream as an attempt 
to save the Amazon Rainforest, she explains: 
This uncanny meshing of an urgent politics, accompanied in Brazil by assassinations, class 
struggle, and the political discourse of those very meta-narratives Lyotard claims are now lost, 
is translated at our end into, on the one hand, a truly helpful gesture of creating a market for 
indigenous rainforest products instead of burning the jungle down for short-term cattle raising 
ventures, but on the other a product which relies on all the marketing networks, advertising and 
image construction, paper products and packaging, mass market supermarket distribution, ag­
ribusiness-supplied milk and corporate, international sugar resources, etc., to construct this 
genuinely postmodern ice cream cone. 
Jennifer Wicke, Postmodern Identity and the Legal Subject, 62 U. Cow. L. REV. 455, 472 ( 1991 ). 
1 56. Apple Company History: 1 983-1985, http://www.apple-history.com (follow "Company 
History" hyperlink; then follow " 1 983-1985" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
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Jobs returned to Apple in 1 997. Since then, he has led the company to 
enormous successes both in the product markets and in the eyes of the capi­
tal markets. Apple shareholders received a mediocre 4.2% return from 
1 984-1997; in contrast, they earned a 38.8% return from 1997-2004. 157 In 
return for this spectacular performance, Jobs has asked for a cash salary of 
exactly one dollar a year. 
No one pretends that this is the only remuneration Jobs receives. He re­
ceived options when he formally accepted the CEO job in 2000. And not 
just a few options: his options to acquire 1 0,000,000 shares were valued in 
2000 at more than $240 million. 158 He voluntarily canceled these options, 
after they were in-the-money, in exchange for restricted stock. He also al­
lowed the company to buy him a private jet. 159 Still, Jobs 's refusal to accept 
more than a token cash salary, at the very least, is unusual. 
2. The Executive-Compensation Image Problem 
Public-company CEOs are overpaid. American CEOs make vastly more 
money than their European and Japanese counterparts. The sheer size of 
many executive compensation contracts is impressive. After Michael Ovitz 
was fired from Disney, he received a severance package of $140 million, 
which struck both shareholders and the general public as wasteful. Richard 
Grasso, the former head of the New York Stock Exchange, received a pay 
package totaling $ 1 87 million. Public outrage has swelled at the contrast 
between the well-paid CEOs and their struggling companies, some of which 
have been mired in accounting scandals. 
For most scholars, however, the more significant problem is not the size 
of compensation but its form. The link between pay and performance is 
weak. In a widely-discussed book, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried argue 
that executive-compensation contracts are not the product of arms-length 
efficient bargaining. 160 Rather, the contracts become vehicles for managerial 
rent-seeking. Bebchuk, Fried, and tax scholar David Walker have pointed 
out the various ways in which executive pay camouflages managerial rent­
seeking. 161 Steve Bainbridge and others disagree, arguing that the contracts 
properly align incentives. 162 Jeffrey Gordon argues that the problem might be 
1 57. From January I ,  1 985 to January I ,  1997, the stock price rose (adjusted for splits and 
dividends) from $3. 1 8  to $5.22. From January I ,  1 997 to January 29, 2006, the stock price rose 
(adjusted for splits and dividends) from $5.22 to $72.03. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2006). 
1 58. STEVEN BALSAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 62 (2002). 
1 59. Balsam characterizes this as the second-largest short-term bonus paid to an executive, 
ever. Id. at I 03--05. 
1 60. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
1 6 1 .  See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Jesse N. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 1 (2002). 
1 62. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 Tux. L. REV. 16 15  
(2005); John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S .  Thomas, ls U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient 
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best addressed through improved disclosure. 163 Whatever the extent of the 
pay-performance gap, one thing is clear. Executive compensation contracts, 
like IPOs, have an image problem. 
Jobs's salary is an effective way of addressing this image problem. Be­
fore rushing to the conclusion that Jobs's salary is just about image, 
however, it is worth considering other possibilities. The structure of the 
deal-all equity, no cash-is arguably efficient. It makes some sense from 
the point of view of aligning incentives. Giving stock to executives roughly 
aligns their interests with those of long-term shareholders. Cash, on the 
other hand, feeds managerial risk aversion. Offering cash, moreover, is often 
tax-inefficient. It requires some explanation to understand why executives 
routinely demand cash in addition to equity. 
Some amount of cash is normally considered efficient from the point of 
view of both the company and the executive. 164 Executives have recurring 
expenses like mortgage payments and tuition payments for their kids. Al­
though it is often possible to borrow against the equity portion of their 
salary, borrowing costs are not trivial. Cash eases executives' liquidity con­
cerns, and executives are willing to accept smaller pay packages in return. 
Offering executives some amount of cash also reduces the risk premium 
and thus may reduce the total amount of compensation paid to the executive. 
Most academics believe that executives are generally risk averse. 165 If a 
company offered compensation only in the form of equity rather than cash, 
its executives would demand a higher risk premium. The risk premium 
might exceed any expected gain from aligning incentives. 166 The optimal 
form of compensation, then, is presumed to be a mix of cash and equity. 
It is possible that Jobs has enough wealth and adequate liquidity that he 
prefers to take compensation in the form of equity alone. Indeed, because 
Jobs became wealthy in the 1980s, much of his wealth may now be held in 
the form of income-generating assets, easing any possible liquidity con­
cerns. But from any traditional academic perspective, Jobs's cash salary of 
one dollar is difficult to explain. Why one dollar, and not zero? Why not 
$100,000? Why not a negative number-requiring Jobs to spend his own 
Pixar-generated cash to buy more stock in the company? The choice of one 
dollar is best explained by its branding effects. (If the company had better 
foresight, it might have set his salary at ninety-nine cents-the cost of a 
download from iTunes.) 
Pay Without Peiformance? (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, No. 05-
05, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=648648. 
163. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There 's a Problem, What's the Remedy? 
The Case for 'Compensation Disclosure and Analysis ', (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Group, No. 0590, 2005), available at http:tnsr.nellco.org/columbia/ 
pllt/papers/0590. 
164. Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, J. CORP L. (forthcoming 2006). 
165. On the risks of using risk aversion as an explanation, see Victor P. Goldberg, Aversion to 
Risk Aversion in the New Institutional Economics, 146 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL EcoN. 
216 ( 1990). 
1 66. Iman Anabtawi, Tournament Theory (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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It is also possible that Jobs is simply an altruistic man. As discussed in 
more detail below, he does not appear to be driven primarily by economic 
self-interest. But declining cash salary would be an odd way of expressing 
altruism. It is difficult to know if the benefits of his denying himself cash 
salary ultimately benefit shareholders, creditors, or customers. If Jobs's goal 
were simply altruistic, he would be better advised to accept the cash and 
make a tax-deductible donation to the charity of his choice. 167 
3. "One Dollar" 
Whatever Jobs's motivation, the branding effects of the structure of 
Jobs's salary are powerful. The gesture is especially powerful because it fits 
so nicely with the existing Apple brand. Apple has developed and cultivated 
a following among its consumers in a way that Microsoft, Dell, Intel, and 
other computer-related companies have not. People love their Macs. Despite 
the market dominance of PCs, Mac users stubbornly hold on to their Macs, 
sometimes forming user groups to help each other out. People try to convert 
others to Apple products. And iPods have become a cultural icon of their 
own. Apple has some of the hallmarks of not just a well-run company, but a 
religion. 
Steve Jobs, as the founder, savior, and leader of Apple, anchors this be­
lief system. His salary reflects his commitment to integrity. It confirms his 
desire to do the job for reasons other than money alone. Blogger Hadley 
Stem explained in his blog post, "One Dollar is Why We Love Apple": 
A buck. 
This is why we love Apple. Because inherent in this salary is an ethos of 
doing things differently and better. Take any old Fortune 500 executive and 
they would insist on a huge salary with a bevy of options thrown in. Not 
1 67. In an interview, Jobs explained the decision as follows: 
INTERVIEWER: You've finally done away with the word "interim" in your title. But you still 
only let Apple pay you $1 a year. Why don't you take any salary or stock yet? 
Joas: The board has made several incredibly generous offers. I have turned them all down for a 
few reasons. For the first year I did not want the shareholders and employees of Pixar to think 
their CEO was going on a camping trip over to Apple never to return. After two and a half 
years, I think that the management teams at Pixar and at Apple have demonstrated that we can 
handle this situation. That's why I dropped the "interim" from my title. I 'm still called iCEO, 
though, because I think it's cool. 
Bottom line is, I didn't return to Apple to make a fortune. I've been very lucky in my life an 
already have one. When I was 25, my net worth was $100 million or so. I decided then that I 
wasn't going to let it ruin my life. There's no way you could ever spend it all, and I don't view 
wealth as something that validates my intelligence. I just wanted to see if we could work to­
gether to turn this thing around when the company was literally on the verge of bankruptcy. 
The decision to go without pay has served me well. 
Steve Jobs, Apple 's One-Dollar-A- Year Man, FORTUNE, Jan. 24, 2000, at 76. 
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Steve. In the age of Enron and Worldcom this is a refreshing thing in­
deed. 168 
Stem's language is telling. He addresses an audience presumed to share 
his values: "We," not "I." And we "love" Apple, we do not just admire or 
respect it. He recognizes the Apple ethos of doing things "differently" -
echoing Apple's ad campaign admonishing the public to "Think Different." 
He assumes a sense of familiarity and shared space with Jobs, whom he re­
fers to as Steve, not Jobs. 169 The blogger continues: 
Of course, Steve Jobs is not a poor man. His wealth is counted in the bil­
lions. But it is rare for someone to run a company and not get paid a huge 
salary. And he isn't doing it for the power. He is doing it for the love of 
creating beautiful pieces of technology. The cult of the Mac can be traced 
directly to this spirit. Whether it is Steve Jobs obsessing over the details of 
the original Mac calculator, or over the interface of the iPod, the love is 
there. He wants to do the right thing and is passionate about it. 
We see this passion in the products and as Apple users become imbued 
with it . . . .  This is why there is the Mac web. Ever heard of the Dell web? 
Or the Windows web? I haven't. And it all goes back to that salary. 110 
This relationship with consumers-the cult of the Mac-is exactly in tune 
with Apple's brand. Through the iPod, Apple is extending the cult of the 
M . d d 171 ac mto new pro ucts an revenue streams. 
I do not mean to suggest that Jobs is motivated solely or even principally 
by marketing concerns. By all accounts, Jobs is a generous, socially con­
scious person. When a New York City teenager was killed on his way to the 
subway by thieves demanding his iPod, Jobs called the family to offer his 
condolences and offer help. (This was not a calculated PR move; the family, 
not Apple, spoke to the press about the phone call.) 172 Jobs's touching 
graduation speech at Stanford this year reflects his inspiring, contrarian ap­
proach. The speech, which admonished graduates to "Stay hungry, stay 
foolish," was widely distributed by email. 173 But however pure Jobs's moti­
vation, his salary structure has marketing effects. His acceptance of a dollar 
is symbolic, but symbolism is not the same thing as an empty gesture. It is 
part of the company's formation of an identity. 
168. Apple Matters, One Dollar Is Why We Love Apple, http://applematters.com/index.php/ 
section/comments/one_dollar_is_ why_ we_love_apple/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
169. Bill Gates, in contrast, is rarely referred to as Bill, even on biogs. 
170. Id. 
1 7 1 .  See also STEVEN LEVY, INSANELY GREAT: THE LIFE AND TIMES O F  MACINTOSH, THE 
COMPUTER THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING (2000). 
1 72. Jobs Calls Family of Stabbing Victim, CNNMONEY.COM, July 6, 2005, http:// 
money.cnn.com/2005/07/06/news/newsmakers/stevejobs_ipod. 
1 73. Steven Jobs, Commencement Address at Stanford University (June 12, 2005), available 
at http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/j une l 5/jobs-061505 .html. 
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* * * 
By now the reader may not be surprised to learn that Google and Ben & 
Jerry's, like Apple, also have unusual executive-compensation contracts. In 
2005 the Google founders and the CEO all agreed to take a cash salary of 
one dollar. 174 The founders are worth more than $7 billion each on paper and 
have sold substantial stakes in the IPO and secondary market. The gesture is 
symbolic. But the symbolism matters. 175 
Ben & Jerry's restrictions on compensation were more than symbolic 
and arguably hampered the company's ability to find talented executives. At 
the time of the IPO, no officer or director received aggregate remuneration 
in excess of $30,000, and all directors and officers received a combined 
compensation of $56,440. 176 For some years following, Ben & Jerry's had a 
"five-to-one salary ratio," limiting the top salary at the company to five 
times that of the lowest-paid employee. 177 The company managed to tum this 
challenge into a branding opportunity. 
Consider the company's search for a CFO in 1 989. The five-to-one sal­
ary structure limited the salary to $75,000 at a time when comparable CFOs 
earned $125,000 to $300,000. A New York Times story entitled "Wntd: 
C.F.O. With 'Flair for Funk' " explained, "The company got the idea that the 
search might take a while when it heard that some of the applicants, while 
they were being interviewed, found it hard to keep from giggling."178 Again, 
the search generated some brand-positive publicity. 179 Indeed, some of the 
"difficulties" in finding a CFO seem a little contrived. Search methods in­
cluded ads in Mother Jones, the Nation, the Utne Reader, and New Age. 180 
While such ads might find left-leaning CFOs who would value the psychic 
income from working at Ben & Jerry's, the ads may have been more about 
selling ice cream to left-leaning readers than about efficiently locating a 
suitable executive. 
1 74. Paul R. La Monica, Google Chiefs Agree to Work for $/, CNNMoNEY.COM, Apr. 8, 
2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/04/08/technology/google_salary. 
1 75.  See BALSAM, supra note 158, at 62, 63. Balsam reports other examples of executives 
forgoing salary, including the CEOs or Chairmen of Capital One Financial, El Paso Energy, Viacom, 
PepsiCo, and Borders. The Pepsi proxy statement explained: 
At [Chairman and CEO Roger] Enrico's request, the Committee again approved a reduction in 
Mr. Enrico's annual salary from $900,000 to $1 ,  and recommended to the Board of Directors 
that it consider using the savings to support front line employees. Jn January 1999, the Board 
approved annual charitable contributions of approximately $ 1,000,000 to fund additional 
scholarships for children of PepsiCo's front line employees. 
Id. at 63. 
1 76. Ben & Jerry's Prospectus, supra note 1 17, at 20. 
1 77. Erik Larson, Forever Young: Ben and Jerry 's Quest to Keep Their Company's Spirit Alive 
as the Business Grows, lNc., July 1988, at 50; see also id. at 57-58 (discussing internal company 
debate over whether to keep the policy, which "makes recruiting difficult"). 
1 78. N.R. Kleinfeld, Wntd: C.F.O. With "Flair for Funk," N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1989, § 3, at 4. 
1 79. Solomon, supra note 129, at 1660; Kleinfeld, supra note 1 78, at 4. 
1 80. Kleinfeld, supra note 1 78, at 4. 
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Ben & Jerry's turned the salary restriction into an even more explicit 
branding opportunity with its gimmicky "Yo! I'm Your CEO !" search in 
1994. 18 1 The contest attracted thousands of mostly ridiculous applications; 
the company ultimately turned to a search firm and hired a former 
McKinsey partner to run the company. 
Google, Ben & Jerry's, and Apple have different customer bases and 
company values. One thing they have in common is a commitment to execu­
tive integrity and a contrarian brand image, and their executive­
compensation policies reinforce that image. 
D. Stanley Works 
The first three case studies illustrate how companies can use deal struc­
ture to build brand equity. The Stanley Works story illustrates how 
executives can squander it. 
In February 2002, Stanley Works announced plans to undergo a "corpo­
rate inversion"-that is, it planned to expatriate from the United States and 
reincorporate in the tax haven of Bermuda. Inversion deals are little more 
than a shuffling of corporate papers with the aim of lowering a corporation's 
long-term U.S. tax liability. An inversion is different from outsourcing, both 
conceptually and substantively. It does not require any substantive change in 
the company's operations, such as a relocation of factories, employees, or 
even corporate headquarters. It is a strategy driven by regulatory-cost engi­
neering. From a corporate-finance perspective-both as a matter of 
transaction-cost engineering and regulatory-cost engineering-it is perfectly 
rational and sensible for a company like Stanley Works to reincorporate in 
Bermuda. 182 The puzzle is not why inversion deals take place, but rather why 
we see so few.183 Branding may be part of the answer. 
1 .  An All-American Company 
Stanley Works is a Connecticut-based tool manufacturer. Stanley tools 
are among the most recognized tools in the United States; its carpentry, gar­
den, and masonry tools can be found in most American garages or 
toolsheds. Stanley's door products, which span everything from simple door 
1 8 1 .  Ben & Jerry's Timeline, http://www.benjerry.com/our_company/about_us/our_history/ 
timeline/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
1 82. One potential drawback is the loss of the Delaware laws and courts; under the internal 
affairs doctrine, corporate governance matters will be governed by the laws of the state (or country) 
of incorporation. 
1 83. The leading economic analysis of inversion deals is Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, 
Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions 
55 NAT'L TAX J. 409 (2002). The authors conclude that market response to inversion announce­
ments reflects not just an anticipation of a reduction of U.S. tax liability on foreign source income, 
but also an expectation of a reduction in U.S. tax liability on U.S. source income through techniques 
such as earnings stripping, in which the inverted corporation receives tax-deductible interest pay­
ments from its U.S. subsidiary. Their paper identifies the capital gains liability of shareholders as an 
important friction. Their analysis does not, however, address branding effects as a potential friction. 
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hinges to automatic and revolving doors, are widely known. The company 
sells industrial, pneumatic, and hydraulic tools to commercial buyers. Its 
two leading distribution channels are Wal-Mart and Home Depot. Home 
Depot alone accounted for eighteen percent of Stanley Works' 2001 reve-
184 nue. 
Stanley Works maintains an all-American brand image. The company 
has been based in New Britain, Connecticut, since its founding in the nine­
teenth century. 185 Stanley has sold millions of hand saws, planes, chisels, 
rulers, tape measures, screwdrivers, and levels to professionals and serious 
Do-It-Yourselfers. The company's brand image taps into the American cul­
tural vision of independence, self-reliance, and industrious self-sufficiency. 
Its reputation for producing quality tools is a valuable asset. The company 
extended its brand by licensing its mark to makers of work boots and gloves, 
lawnmowers, ladders, and other products that the company did not manufac­
ture itself. 186 
2. The Inversion Deal 
Corporate inversion describes the legal process of reincorporating an 
American company in a tax haven such as Bermuda. The basic deal works 
as follows. A domestic parent corporation first secures approval from its 
shareholders to do the deal. Then, with appropriate consent, it creates a new 
corporation in the tax haven. The foreign corporation exchanges its stock for 
the stock or assets of the inverting corporation, which becomes a subsidiary 
of the foreign parent. The shareholders of the domestic corporation are left 
holding shares of the foreign parent. It is nothing more than a paper­
shuffling transaction: no factories, offices, or headquarters must be moved. 
There are some nontax regulatory implications. The company may be sub­
ject to fewer environmental regulations or consumer regulations. 
Shareholders may not be able to bring lawsuits in state court in the United 
States. By all accounts, though, tax savings are the deal's reason for being. 
The tax savings arise from the residence-based system for taxing the in­
come from international operations. The United States taxes its citizens, 
including corporate citizens, on their worldwide income. Foreign citizens, 
however, are taxed only on their U.S. source-based income. Reincorporation 
accomplishes nothing for a company that has operations exclusively in the 
United States. For companies like Stanley Works with operations both at 
home and abroad, the potential gains are impressive, through manners both 
clearly licit and less so. 
1 84. Id. at 12. 
1 85. See Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, 1 18 HARV. L. REv. 2 1 7 1 ,  2274 (2003). 
1 86. The Beanstalk Group, Client Showcase Case Studies: The Stanley Works, http:// 
www.beanstalk.com/casestudies/stanley.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
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The United States looks to the place of incorporation to determine 
whether a corporation is domestic or foreign. 187 Domestic corporations gen­
erally face U.S. taxation on foreign source income when that income is 
repatriated to the United States. Incorporating a foreign subsidiary to con­
duct foreign operations can defer taxation until the foreign earnings are 
distributed to the domestic parent as a dividend. Under the "subpart F" anti­
deferral regimes, however, certain types of mobile passive income earned 
overseas, such as interest, dividends, and royalties, are taxed currently as if 
earnings had already been distributed to the domestic parent. 1 88 The domes­
tic parent is only able to use the benefits of deferral with respect to income 
earned by the foreign subsidiary if it is not "subpart F" income. U.S.-based 
multinational corporations, then, are at a significant disadvantage from oth­
erwise similarly situated foreign multinationals. Corporate inversions may 
be rationalized as "self-help territoriality"189 -a regulatory-engineering ma­
neuver designed to level what many believe is an unfair playing field. 190 
As a practical matter, inversion offers two main sources of tax savings: 
reduction of U.S. tax on foreign income and reduction of U.S.  tax on U.S. 
income. Reduction of U.S. tax on foreign income results from the elimina­
tion of U.S. tax on foreign subpart-F income. A Bermuda company can 
make its portfolio investments from Bermuda, earning income from interest, 
dividends, and royalties, and not face U.S. tax on that income. The highly 
mobile nature of passive income makes this tax reduction somewhat prob­
lematic, but there are sound arguments in favor of the United States not 
taxing this income. 
More problematic is the reduction of U.S. tax on U.S. income. These 
savings take place primarily through techniques of earnings-stripping and 
transfer pricing. Earnings-stripping refers to techniques in which the U.S. 
subsidiary is saddled with large amounts of intercompany debt; interest 
payments to the foreign parent are normally deductible in the United States. 
Other techniques for reducing U.S. income include aggressive manipulation 
of royalty payments to the parent company, administrative fees, and transfer 
prices. 19 1  Code provisions preclude the ability of a multinational corporation 
to eliminate U.S. tax on U.S. income entirely, but opportunities for substan­
tial tax savings remain. 192 
1 87. l.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (2000) ("The term 'domestic' when applied to a corporation . . .  
means created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any 
State . . .  "). 
1 88. See generally l.R.C. §§ 952-64 (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
1 89. See Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The 
Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. TAX 
REV. 475, 491 (2005). 
190. Cf OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, DEP'T OF TREASURY, CORPORATE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: 
TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2002), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/inversion.pdf. 
1 9 1 .  Kirsch, supra note 1 89, a t  493. 
1 92. See id. Section 163(j) limits interest stripping by limiting the deductibility of interest 
payments to related corporations by taxpayers with excessive leverage. Section 482 addresses trans­
fer pricing and other non-arms-length transactions that attempt to shift income improperly. Id. 
1 624 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104: 1581  
Inversions can trigger some immediate adverse tax consequences, par­
ticularly for shareholders. If the inversion is structured as a stock transaction 
in which shareholders exchange their old shares for new shares in the corpo­
rate parent, then the shareholders may have to recognize gain equal to the 
excess of the fair-market value of the stock over the shareholder's adjusted 
basis. 193 The inversion, in other words, is treated as a realization event. The 
corporation itself may have to pay tax if the inversion is structured as an 
asset acquisition by the new foreign parent. 194 
Stanley Works proposed an inversion transaction to its shareholders; re­
incorporation requires shareholder approval. The company explained to 
shareholders that the transaction was necessary to compete globally: "In 
today's global economy, numerous foreign competitors pay lower taxes on 
their worldwide operations. The U.S. tax rules place us at a competitive dis­
advantage in the global marketplace."195 The company noted that two of its 
U.S. competitors, Ingersoll-Rand and Cooper Industries, reincorporated in 
Bermuda. "In our view our reincorporation in Bermuda is necessary in order 
to create a level playing field enabling us to become a stronger, more com­
petitive company."196 The company noted, however, that it would retain its 
character as an American company. "It is our goal to keep our management 
in the U.S. and our headquarters in New Britain, Connecticut."197 Market 
reaction to the inversion announcement was positive, and the company nar­
rowly received shareholder approval. The shareholder vote was declared 
void, however, after the Connecticut Attorney General sued to block the 
transaction, alleging that 40l(k) shareholders may have been confused by 
contradictory statements in their materials regarding the consequences of a 
failure to vote by proxy. 198 In the months following the voided shareholder 
vote, public protests and media criticism increased, and the board of Direc­
tors ultimately voted to cancel the transaction in August 2002.199 
3 .  What Stopped the Deal? 
The Stanley Works inversion would have generated tax savings for the 
company. Market reaction was positive. Why, then, did the Stanley Works 
board reverse course? 
1 93. l.R.C. § 367 (2000); Kirsch, supra note 1 89, at 494-95. 
194. l.R.C. § 367(a)(l )  (2000); Kirsch, supra note 189, at 495; Samuel C. Thompson, Jr. & 
Robert Allen Clary II, Economic Substance, Inversions, and the Bush-Kerry International Tax Re­
form Debate, 103 TAX NOTES 1 385, 1 546--48 (June 14, 2004). 
1 95. Stanley Works Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-4), at 2 (May 28, 2002). 
1 96. Id. 
1 97. Id. 
1 98. See Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, supra note 1 85,  at 2274. 
1 99. Kirsch, supra note 1 89, at 529. 
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Political pressure was an obvious concern. Politicians were not shy 
about branding Stanley Works a traitor.200 Senator Charles Grassley charged 
the company with taking advantage of the economic effect of the September 
1 1  terrorist attacks: "Here's a company pulling up stakes when the cleanup 
at Ground Zero is barely done."201 
The political rhetoric led to legislation that prevents expatriated corpora­
tions from entering into government contracts with the Department of 
Homeland Security.202 The restriction may be waived, however, if the Secre­
tary of Homeland Security determines that a waiver is required "in the 
interests of homeland security."203 Some states enacted similar provisions 
barring state agencies from contracting with expatriate corporations.204 Con­
gress considered several tax bills aimed at eliminating the benefits of 
corporate inversions, ultimately enacting a forward-looking provision in 
2004, long after the Stanley Works deal failed.205 
Stanley Works did not cite bad publicity as a reason for canceling the 
proposed transaction. Instead, the company rather dubiously pointed to "the 
growing prospect of comprehensive tax legislation . . . .  Congress has started 
down a path to deliver comprehensive tax reform that would eliminate the 
inequities of U.S. international taxation . . . . "206 But it seems unlikely that 
the board anticipated meaningful international tax reform. What was really 
going on? 
The Stanley Works inversion received significant attention from tax 
scholars. 207 A combination of factors, including shareholder hostility, legal 
uncertainty, and patriotism may have contributed to management's decision 
not to move forward. Even the issue of shareholder hostility is complex. 
Some shareholders may have been motivated by altruism, patriotism, or so­
cial responsibility, while others may have been motivated by economic self­
interest. (Recall that a stock inversion like the one proposed by Stanley 
Works triggers a shareholder-level tax. The amount of the tax depends on 
the shareholder's basis.) It is also possible that some shareholders resisted 
the move for non-tax-related reasons. With the parent company in Bermuda, 
200. Cf Nader, supra note 1 06, at 201 (noting a ban on repatriation as one of several impor­
tant social-responsibility issues). 
201 .  Tim Reason, Love It and Leave It? The Hue-and-Cry Over Corporate Inversions May 
Change the Way Overseas Income ls Taxed, CFO.COM, July 1 ,  2002, http://www.cfo.com/ 
article.cfm/3005328/1/c_3046525?f=archives. 
202. Kirsch, supra note 1 89, at 482. 
203. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. 395(d) (Supp. 2003). 
204. Kirsch, supra note 1 89, at 499. 
205. Id. at 506. 
206. Stanley Works, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 5 (Aug. I ,  2002), available at 
http://www.secinfo.com/ds V sj.31  k4.htm. 
207. See, e.g. , OFFICE OF TAX PoL'v, supra note 190; Desai & Hines, supra note 183;  Kirsch, 
supra note 1 89; Thompson & Clary, supra note 194. 
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shareholders would have had a more difficult time protecting their rights 
through a derivative action.208 
Michael Kirsch's recent article provides the most detailed examination 
of the Stanley Works transaction and the political fallout that followed. 
Kirsch describes the Homeland Security restrictions as symbolic legislation. 
He cites the rhetoric used by inversion critics--calling the corporations 
Benedict Arnolds, traitors, tax dodgers, tax cheats, and so on, and the use of 
September 1 1 , 200 1 as the retroactive date of many bills-as evidence of the 
symbolic importance of the bill.209 But he argues that the legislation had lit­
tle instrumental effect. 
Kirsch views the Homeland Security legislation largely as a victory for 
expatriate corporations.210 In one sense, Kirsch is certainly correct. As he 
points out, the legislation is drafted in such a way to allow U.S. subsidiaries 
of expatriate corporations to contract with the Department of Homeland 
Security, eviscerating the practical impact of the bill. For example, Accen­
ture, a Bermuda company that inverted in 200 1 ,  was awarded a $10 billion 
contract by the Department in 2004 .21 1 
Kirsch does not directly address the branding implications of the deal. 
He does, however, discuss the effects in terms of social norms.212 Kirsch ac­
knowledges that "there also appear to have been some aspects of nonlegal 
social norms enforcement in play."213 He explains, 
As one contemporary newspaper article observed, "The question is 
whether all this ill will [arising from the planned expatriation] is headed 
out to the Home Depot in Peoria." Another article on the same topic ob­
served that "[t]he typical Stanley customer is an American male, age 25 to 
54. Often, he is a tradesman who belongs to a union. And union members 
generally know which companies are perceived as friendly to American 
workers and American causes."214 
Kirsch also notes that Stanley sold retail products to consumers under its 
own name, whereas most of the other expatriating corporations did not.215 
208. Developments in the law-Jobs and Borders, supra note 1 85, at 2280. 
209. Kirsch, supra note 1 89, at 509. 
2 1 0. Id. at 5 1 1 ("It enabled its supporters to claim credit for some legislation that purported to 
address a perceived problem, thereby satisfying the general public's demand for action. At the same 
time . . .  it ensured that the interested, involved group that would actually be affected by the legisla­
tion [i.e. expatriate corporations] received their desired result."). 
2 1 1 .  Id. at 5 14. 
2 1 2. Id. at 523 ("[A] corporation could be the target of second order sanctions to the extent 
social norms disfavored a corporate parent changing its place of incorporation in pursuit of tax 
savings. For example, the firm might experience a backlash from U.S. customers and a possible 
reduction in revenue."). 
2 13. Id. at 530. 
214. Id. at 53 1 (quoting Dan Haar, Image Hammered: Stanley Move Draws Sharp Criticism, 
But Will Customers Stick with Brand?, HARTFORD COURANT, May 10, 2002, at E l ;  Matthew 
Lubanko, Stanley 's Brand Tarnished? Experts: Over Long Haul, Consumers Aren 't Likely to Ham­
mer Toolmaker, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 3, 2002, at El) .  
215 .  Id. at 532. 
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Kirsch, however, argues that Stanley's decision resulted not from informal 
social-norm enforcement, but from concern about legal-based instrumental 
factors. 216 
With respect to Stanley Works, Kirsch's analysis understates the effec­
tiveness of rhetoric. The rhetoric tarnished the brand. Although it is possible 
that Stanley Works declined to do the inversion because of its uncertain le­
gal treatment, that explanation strikes me as highly unlikely. Retroactive tax 
legislation is unusual. Here, I think the simpler explanation is the correct 
one: the political rhetoric worked. It amplified the branding implications of 
the deal. 
Inversion critics offered a powerful narrative, casting Stanley Works' 
management in the stereotypical role of greedy capitalist. The story is a fa­
miliar one. In popular culture, local communities are often presented as 
under attack by soulless multinational corporations. In the movie Other 
People 's Money,211 for example, a takeover artist (Larry "the Liquidator" 
Garfield), played by Danny DeVito, targets the New England Wire and Ca­
ble Company. The struggling company is defended by its paternalistic 
founder, Andrew Jorgensen, played by Gregory Peck.218 Stanley Works could 
easily drop into this familiar narrative as the old wire-and-cable company. 
By barraging the Stanley Works directors with publicity, opponents forced 
the directors to choose their self-image-would they be Danny DeVito, or 
Gregory Peck? 
The political rhetoric might not have had the same impact on a reinsur­
ance company or oil and gas company. No one expects Exxon or Tyco to be 
socially responsible. Stanley Works' inversion attempt ultimately may have 
been sunk by its own valuable brand image. Consider the many companies 
that completed inversions before Stanley Works: McDermott, Helen of Troy, 
Triton Energy, Chicago Bridge & Iron, Tyco, Santa Fe International, Fruit of 
the Loom, Playstar, Gold Reserve, Xoma, Transocean, PXRE, Everest Rein­
surance, White Mountain Insurance, Trenwick, Applied Power, R&B 
Falcon, Foster Wheeler, Cooper Industries, Global Marine, Ingersoll Rand, 
Nabors Industries, and Noble Drilling.219 Of these, only Fruit of the Loom 
sells directly to a broad base of consumers. If Stanley Works were just an­
other reinsurance company or oil and gas conglomerate, its directors would 
now be attending annual meetings in the Caribbean instead of Connecticut. 
2 16. Id. at 530. Kirsch explains that members of Congress had offered Stanley assurances that 
tax reform was on the horizon, and he notes that some of the tax-focused bills in Congress might 
have eliminated the tax benefits that Stanley sought, and that the Homeland Security legislation was 
being actively considered. See id. 
2 1 7. OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (Warner Bros. 199 1 ). 
2 1 8. See Larry Ribstein, Wall Street and Vine: Hollywood's View of Business 14 (Univ. Ill. 
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LE05-010, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=563 l 8 l .  
2 19. Desai & Hines, supra note 183, at 1 8--20. 
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Ill. BRANDING THE DEAL: THE MECHANISMS 
OF MARKETING INEFFICIENCY 
[Vol. 104: 1 5 8 1  
The case studies in the previous Section show that deal structure can af­
fect the brand image of a company. Finding the common thread, though, is a 
challenge. Is the branding effect accidental and unexpected, or can it be pre­
dicted? How does a decision about legal structure filter down to the point at 
which it has an effect on consumers? Does branding a deal make sense for 
all companies, or only some? 
In this Section, I argue that the branding effects of deal structure are 
most important for companies that target early adopters or other opinion 
leaders.22° Companies are more likely to reach consumers effectively 
through branding moments early in the lifecycle of the company, and the 
branding message of an unusual deal structure is more likely to reach con­
sumers indirectly. The branding implications of deals are more important, 
then, for companies that can target early adopters or opinion leaders, such as 
technology companies, firms that produce trendy or fashionable consumer 
goods, cult brands, and socially responsible companies. 
To explain which companies are more likely to use deal structure as a 
branding mechanism, it is useful to consider the process and not just the 
underlying activities of the firm. Consider two alternative explanations for 
branding through deal structure: managerial consumption and consumer 
signaling. 
Managerial consumption. Unusual deal structures might simply reflect 
idiosyncratic, economically irrational preferences on the part of the foun­
ders. Larry and Sergey might be expressing geek solidarity; Ben and Jerry, 
localism; Steve Jobs, altruism; and the Stanley Works managers, patriotism. 
Their chosen deal structures might reflect an effort by founders to engage in 
"conspicuous consumption," meaning that the founders derive utility not 
from the intrinsic value of the deal structure but rather because of its waste­
fulness or opulence. The structure's value exists only because it could be 
observed by select friends and competitors. 221 
If managerial consumption is the real goal, then we should approach the 
deals with a skeptical eye, as we might view other goods with a strong con­
sumption component, like corporate charitable contributions, golf retreats, 
or private jets. If managerial consumption is driving these unusual cases, 
then lawyers involved in such deals have an ethical duty to look out for the 
corporate entity and its shareholders.222 
220. For a discussion of innovators, early adopters, and the diffusion of innovation, see 
EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION (4th ed. 1995); GEOFFREY A. MOORE, CROSSING 
THE CHASM: MARKETING AND SELLING HIGH-TECH PRODUCTS TO MAINSTREAM CUSTOMERS 9-25 
(rev. ed. 1 999). 
22 1 .  On the origins of the term "conspicuous consumption," see THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE 
THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 75-77 (B. w. Huebsch ed. 1918). In this context, it is not a leisure 
class but rather an entrepreneurial class at issue. 
222. In practice, of course, the business judgment rule would likely protect the company 
against any potential lawsuits. 
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Consumer signaling. Alternatively, unusual deal structures may send 
valuable messages to consumers. If the structure is costly to the finn in the 
short tenn, it may prove valuable in the long run by acting as an investment 
in reputation and signaling quality assurance. 223 This familiar model of 
branding, often referred to as the Klein-Leffler model,224 would suggest that 
the unusual deal structure is simply a reputational bonding mechanism. The 
deals are costly but economically rational, as the resulting brand equity is 
expected to pay dividends over time. This signaling explanation suggests 
that companies that produce credence goods are more likely to employ un­
usual deal structures. 
But unlike the usual Klein-Leffler situation, in this case the signal need 
not be especially costly to be valuable.225 It may also be valuable if opinion 
leaders can verify the signal and communicate the message to consumers. 
Klein-Leffler focuses our attention on the suppliers of goods and services; 
advertising reflects their commitment to deliver quality products over the 
long haul. But the key here is the demand side of the equation: consumers. 
Deal structure may be more effective for some companies than others, de­
pending on the demographics of their consumers and the stage of their brand 
development. Specifically, deal structure is an effective advertising medium 
when it reaches early adopters and opinion leaders: sophisticated, knowl­
edgeable consumers who start trends.226 
Casual empiricism supports the signaling explanation. It seems unlikely, 
for example, that the Stanley Works directors suddenly and spontaneously 
became more patriotic for reasons unrelated to branding. And while the 
Google founders are quirky, it seems unlikely that they could have forced 
the auction structure on the other pre-IPO shareholders without justifying 
the move in terms of long-term shareholder value. Still, I cannot dismiss the 
managerial consumption explanation out of hand. Empirical testing would 
be useful. For example, the managerial-consumption explanation would 
predict that companies with weak shareholder accountability would be more 
likely to use unusual deal structures. The signaling story, on the other hand, 
223. Marketing scholars already find a direct relationship between a firm's financial perform­
ance and the perceived quality of its goods. See Jerry B. Swann et al., Trademarks and Marketing, 
9 1  TRADEMARK REPORTER 787, 790 (2001). It is only one step further to take a firm's structuring of 
internal corporate governance matters and use it to upgrade the perceived quality of the goods. 
224. See Klein & Leffler, supra note 7 1 .  
225. Focusing on deal structure as a method of quality assurance for credence goods is part of 
the story, although ultimately it does not seem to explain everything. If deal structure is used solely 
as a quality-assurance tool, the value of the signal depends on its cost. While it seems likely that the 
contract designs in the case of Google, Ben & Jerry's, or Apple were inefficient (setting aside any 
branding implications), it is not so clear that the Ben & Jerry's and Apple structures were exceed­
ingly costly. Nor is it clear that the Google founders anticipated leaving quite so much money on the 
table. Furthermore, the brand equity generated by the deal structure may not bear a close relation­
ship to its cost. Finally, if quality assurance were the whole story, then one would expect deal 
structure to be used most often to brand credence goods. But consider the list of firms that have 
conducted auction IPOs. While some companies are "integrity companies"-Momingstar and ar­
guably Google-others offer experience goods for which the quality is immediately apparent, such 
as Peel's Coffee. 
226. See generally Gladwell, supra note 72. 
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suggests that the use of unusual deal structures is more related to the process 
of branding than to the process of financing. It is not the manager­
shareholder relationship that drives these deals; it is the company-consumer 
relationship--the topic to which I now tum. 
A. Branding through Desirable Atmospherics 
The legal system often treats consumers as if they care only about the 
functionality of the products they buy.221 This approach is grounded in the 
thinking of the pre-World War II "Harvard School" of economics, which 
viewed brand marketing as little more than a method for insulating market 
share from price competition and creating high barriers to entry.228 Advertis­
ing deserved scorn, not praise. Harvard's Edward Chamberlain would have 
permitted unlimited confusion through imitation, rendering advertising al­
most pointless. 229 Advertising was little more than consumer deception, 
tricking consumers into buying products based on illusory wants or de-
• 230 sires. 
Legal scholarship reflected the Harvard School's teachings. In his semi­
nal article, Advertising and the Public Interest, Yale's Ralph Brown 
characterized modern advertising as a "black art" whose practitioners "are 
part of the larger army which employs threats, cajolery, emotions, personal­
ity, persistence and facts in what is termed aggressive selling."231 Brown 
drew a sharp line between providing information and persuasive advertising. 
Only the former benefited the public interest. ''To the extent that the blan­
dishments of sellers inform buyers what is to be bought, and at what price, 
advertising undoubtedly quickens the stream of commerce."232 Persuasive 
advertising, on the other hand, was economic waste. "If we consider first the 
total stream of production and consumption, persuasive advertising seems 
only to consume resources that might be put to better use producing more 
goods and services. It does not increase total demand; it only increases 
wants."233 Brown dismissed advertising's shaping of consumer preferences 
as mere illusions. 234 Competition among brands was a choice "between one 
227. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preference for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and 
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 1 18 HARV. L. REv. 525 (2005). 
228. See Swann et al., supra note 223, at 788. 
229. Id. 
230. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modem Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 1 08 
YALE L.J. 1 687, 1 692 ( 1999). 
23 1 .  Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advenising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Sym-
bols, 57 YALE L.J. 1 165, 1 165-66 ( 1948). 
232. Id. at I I 68. 
233. Id. at I 1 69. 
234. Id. at I 1 8 1 .  Brown notes: 
Other values derive from the proposition that cheapness is not enough. The buyer of an adver­
tised good buys more than a parcel of food or fabric; he buys the pause that refreshes. the hand 
that has never lost its skill, the priceless ingredient that is the reputation of its maker. All these 
may be illusions, but they cost money to create, and if the creators recoup their outlay, who is 
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illusion and another."235 The task for courts addressing trademark claims, 
therefore, was to pick out the threads of informative advertising, and ignore 
the persuasive fabric.236 Trademark protection, Brown concluded, should be 
limited to cases in which there was a likelihood of consumer confusion . 
. Times have changed.237 Most scholars today, applying the lessons of the 
Chicago School, view brands as a mechanism for enhancing consumer effi­
ciency, diversifying goods, improving quality control, and facilitating entry 
for new manufacturers.238 Trademark law increasingly protects trade sym­
bols not just in cases of consumer confusion, but also in cases in which 
another's use of the trademark may affect the cultural meaning of the 
brand.239 
Marketing scholarship reflects this shift in how we understand consum­
ers. A consumer buying a car looks at more than price, power, safety, color, 
and gas mileage. Consumers also buy the brand-the set of mental associa­
tions that accompanies the name. But the fact that branding is triggered by 
memory does not mean that it is smoke and mirrors. Consumers strive to 
satisfy their psychological needs, not just their physical needs. Opening a 
Tiffany's box feels different than opening a box from Kmart, and will appeal 
to different customers.240 Brands help the consumer create an identity, not 
just identify the source of the product.241 Through brands, products produce 
not just functional benefits but emotional and self-expressive benefits. 
Brand image is a powerful form of communication with the consumer. 
Brand image, although intangible, is a valuable piece of property with in­
trinsic worth and meaning.242 As explained by Jessica Litman, the value of a 
Id. 
the poorer? Among the many illusions which advertising can fashion are those of lavishness, 
refinement, security, and romance. 
235. Id. at 1 1 83. 
236. Id. at 1 1 84. 
237. For a more comprehensive discussion of the development of brands, and the "brand 
manager system," see George S. Low & Ronald A. Fullerton, Brands, Brand Management and the 
Brand Manager System: A Critical-Historical Evaluation, 3 1  J. MARKETING RES. 173 (1 994). Low 
and Fullerton argue that as corporate management evolves away from bureaucratic conglomerate 
systems to more entrepreneurial ones, more entrepreneurial brand-manager roles will develop. Us­
ing deal structure as a marketing device may become more common as brand managers seek more 
creative ways to market brands. 
238. See Swann et al., supra note 223, at 790. 
239. Laura R. Bradford, Parody and Perception: Using Cognitive Research to Expand Fair 
Use in Copyright (NYU Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 05-09, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=728604; Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the 
Advertising Age, 1 08 YALE L.J. 1 7 17, 1721-25 (1999). Litman explains, "Courts' increased willing­
ness to find an actionable likelihood of confusion has meant that, as a practical matter, nearly any 
unauthorized use of a trade symbol with the potential to undermine the symbol's trademark distinct­
iveness may persuade a federal judge to grant an injunction." Id. at 1 722. 
240. Aaker explains, "Further, the wearing of a Tiffany bracelet may even make the wearer 
feel more attractive and confident . . . .  The associations of prestige and quality are hypothesized to 
actually change the use experience." DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 1 61 ( 1991  ). 
241 .  Swann et al. ,  supra note 223, at 796. 
242. See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 962-63 ( 1993). 
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trademark like Batman has nothing to do with identifying Warner Brothers 
as the manufacturing source. "The worth of such valuable trade symbols lies 
less in their designation of product source than in their power to imbue a 
product line with desirable atmospherics."243 Indeed, atmospherics may 
dominate all other product attributes. The product can become simply a de­
livery vehicle for the brand, which is what is really being consumed. Litman 
explains: 
Ask a child, and he'll persuade you that the difference between a box of 
Kellogg's Com Flakes with a picture of Batman on it and some other box 
without one is real. There is nothing imaginary about it. It has nothing to 
do with the way cereal tastes. What kids want isn't a nutritious part of a 
complete breakfast; they want Batman to have breakfast with them.244 
In a world where many products serve primarily as brand delivery vehi­
cles-Derek Jeter Bobblehead dolls, NARS Orgasm perfumes,245 Black Dog 
T-Shirts246 -the importance of brand image is hard to deny. If cereal is really 
about Batman, then the same might be true for other products. Ice cream 
isn't just creamy and sweet; it is rain forests and hormone-free cows and 
leaf-peeping in Vermont. An iPod is not just a convenient method for listen­
ing to music; it is a hip world where life is random and rewards go to those 
who think different. 
If I'm right that we live in a world where brand image is both richly tex­
tured and powerful in its impact on consumers, it is not surprising that deal 
structure weaves its way into the purchasing decision. Deal structure 
changes the atmospherics. From a pure, rational-actor point of view, it is 
unclear why consumers care about the social responsibility of a manufac­
turer, let alone its internal corporate govemance.247 Yet we know that Ben & 
Jerry's sells more ice cream because of its preservation efforts in the Ama­
zon rainforest.248 
243. Litman, supra note 239, at 1 726. 
244. Id. at 1727. Whether trademark law should protect the powerful impact of brand image is 
beyond the scope of this Article. Litman makes a powerful case that while the atmospherics are real, 
they are not worthy of legal protection. 
245. See Rob Walker, Color Coding, N.Y. TIMES, July 3 1 ,  2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 1 7. 
246. See Posting of Victor Fleischer lo Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/ 
2005/08/gen_x_six_feet_.html (Aug. 16, 2005). 
247. ROBERT H. FRANK, WHAT PRICE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND?: ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN 
COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS 65 (2003) ("The standard free-rider model suggests that buyers will 
not be willing to pay a premium for products produced by socially responsible firms."). 
248. Id. Recent scholarship has picked up on the changed relationship between consumers and 
brands. Cognitive science research suggests that our brains classify things as good or bad as soon as 
we see them. Laura Bradford, an intellectual-property scholar, has noted that much of "modem 
advertising is designed to increase positive associations with advertised brands and products through 
use of symbolic and emotional appeals to the values of the target audience." Bradford, supra note 
239, at 3 1 .  See generally John O'Shaughnessy & Nicholas Jackson O'Shaughnessy, PERSUASION IN 
ADVERTISING (2003). 
Douglas Kysar has identified the importance of process in consumer-preference satisfaction. 
Regulators and economists draw a process-product distinction. Consumers, however, derive utility 
from understanding the process by which a product is made. Kysar explains: 
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B. Reaching Early Adopters 
Deal structure is not likely to be an effective advertising medium for 
reaching large numbers of consumers. A typical ice cream purchaser or 
computer user doesn't know anything about IPOs. One particular class of 
consumers, however, is better educated, wealthier, smarter, more open­
rninded, more adventurous, and has a higher social status than your average 
consumer: early adopters.249 And that is exactly who marketers try to reach 
to establish a brand image. Early adopters are sophisticated consumers who 
experiment with new products and, by word-of-mouth, spread the message 
to other consumers. Early adopters seek information about innovations more 
actively than later adopters and have higher degrees of opinion leadership.250 
As an advertising medium, deal structure resembles other specialized 
marketing techniques like buzz marketing. Consider the market for ad space 
on biogs. Blog ads would seem like an ineffective use of resources, consid­
ering the narrow readership of most biogs. The ad space sells, however, 
because it allows companies who want to reach early adopters an easy ac­
cess point. Because readers of blogs tend to be highly literate, highly 
networked, and influential, purchasers of blog ads skew towards the likes of 
Paramount Pictures, Wall Street Journal, Penguin Books, Oxford University 
Press, and various political groups.251 
Using deal structure as a branding device thus seems especially well­
suited to companies reaching out to early adopters to build a brand. These 
include technology brands, integrity brands, cult brands, and socially re­
sponsible brands. 
Technology brands. Technology products demand trust from consumers. 
Consumers must invest their time in learning how to use the technology on 
top of the financial cost. Many consumers, then, wait to adopt a new tech­
nology until a critical mass has already done so. This process--documented 
in detail in Everett Rogers's Diffusion of Innovations and more recently in 
Malcolm Gladwell's The Tipping Point-shows the importance of early 
adopters, who act as a bridge between innovators and the majority of con­
sumers. 
[J]ust as people derive utility from feeling as if they participate in certain types of labor or po­
litical decisionmaking processes, so too might consumers derive utility from participating in a 
marketplace that is rich with information about the consequences of consumption. Such a mar­
ketplace enables consumers to feel as if their purchasing behavior expresses a viewpoint on 
critical aspects of the global economy, even apart from consideration of any instrumental im­
pact that such purchasing behavior might have on manufacturing processes. 
Kysar, supra note 227, at 607. Kysar argues against further use of the process-product distinction by 
regulators. 
249. See EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 288-90 (5th ed. 2003). 
250. Id. at 292. Particularly for deals with subtle branding implications, like an auction IPO or 
a policy against slotting allowances, branding is only relevant to the extent PR about the deal 
reaches financially sophisticated consumers. The socioeconomic status of early adopters makes 
them a natural fit. 
25 1 .  Blogads, Blog Advertising Makes Opinions, http://www.blogads.com/advertiser_html 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
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Before an innovation can cross the chasm into widespread adoption, the 
manufacturer must win over the early adopters. When commercializing a 
product for wider distribution, companies sometimes make changes to the 
product that produce short-term profits but weaken the technology. Unusual 
deal structures may allow technology companies to signal to consumers that, 
notwithstanding the presence of all the bankers and lawyers, the nerds are 
still in charge. 
Integrity brands and socially responsible brands. Credence goods have 
qualities that the consumer cannot fully evaluate even after purchase and 
consumption.252 Integrity brands are brands that generate a sense of trust 
where the integrity or social responsibility of the firm is an important prod­
uct attribute. Examples include healthcare, financial services, education, 
environmentally sensitive products, and organic foods.253 With these prod­
ucts, the quality of the goods is difficult to measure even after purchase. A 
shareholder in a mutual fund can easily observe cash, but not opportunities 
for managerial rent-seeking;254 a fine cup of Peet's coffee does not taste or­
ganic. The integrity and values of the managers serve as a proxy for the 
integrity of the process of producing the product. By signaling the integrity 
of the managers, deal structure can signal the quality of other attributes that 
are difficult to observe. 
With these products, companies are not concerned about early adopters 
so much as other opinion leaders or information specialists. Consumers pur­
chasing integrity products rely on information specialists such as corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) groups, experts, or others who have already in­
vested the time to gather the relevant information. Lawyers and law 
professors, for example, are frequently asked for legal services referrals. 
Socially responsible mutual funds serve as reputational intermediaries to 
allow CSR-sensitive investors to allocate their investments in a socially re­
sponsible manner. Well-known social-responsibility brands like Ben & 
Jerry's and the Body Shop cultivate their consumers through their well­
informed opinion leaders.255 
252. Michael R. Darby & Edi Karny, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16  
J.L. & EcoN. 67 (1973); Phillip Nelson, Infonnation and Consumer Behavior, 78 J .  PoL. EcoN. 3 1 1  
(1 970); George J .  Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcoN. 213 ( 1961). 
253. Jason Scott Johnston, Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of 
Market Incentives for Corporate Environmental Performance 70 (Univ. Of Penn. Law Sch. Inst. for 
Law & Econ, Research Paper No. 05- 1 6, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=725 103 ("The 
things that [social-responsibility-minded] consumers and investors care about-the environmental, 
health and safety effects of a company's operations-are what economists call credence goods, 
goods that the consumer (or investor) never actually learns about fully, even after buying and con­
suming the good (or investing in the stock)."); see also Timothy J. Feddersen & Thomas W. 
Gilligan, Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods, 10 J. EcoN. & MGMT. 
STRATEGY 149 (2001). 
254. See William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in 
the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TuL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006), available at http:// 
law.marquette.edu/hurt/Mutua!Funds-Birdthistle8-24-05.pdf. 
255. E.g., Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics 
by Modem Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1625, 
1638-63 (1993) (discussing Ben & Jerry's and The Body Shop in depth). 
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Information specialists who can verify firms' claims about integrity are 
essential to avoiding the problem of cheap talk.256 Ex post litigation chal­
lenging false or misleading claims is unlikely to be effective. And, as 
illustrated by the recent case involving Nike's statements about sweatshops, 
cheap talk may even be protected by the First Amendment.257 To make the 
signal credible, then, the information must be verified or certified by a third 
party.258 Like the auditors of financial statements, NGOs or other third-party 
verifiers can investigate the integrity of firms and pass their opinions along 
to consumers. The presence of these information specialists makes deal 
structure an appealing advertising medium. 
Cult brands. There is no settled meaning to the term "cult brand." As I 
use the term here, I refer to products that have strong expressive value. Rit­
ual products-products that consumers buy through small, regular 
purchases-lend themselves to this category. Companies that become part 
of a social routine, such as Coldstone Ice Cream, Starbucks and Peet's Cof­
fee, and Krispy Kreme, may work well. Similarly, many entertainment 
products become a regular part of a consumer's day. ESPN, the sports net­
work, brought a sense of journalistic integrity to sports coverage. KCRW, a 
public radio station in Los Angeles, rejects payola and instead offers "hand­
picked" music from knowledgeable deej ays. 
Other cult brands include technology firms that aim to disrupt product 
markets by changing the user's relationship with the product. Examples in­
clude Apple (including not just the Mac but the iPod and iTunes), TiVo, 
NetFlix, Flickr (an online photo-management site), and Facebook (a social­
networking site). Using such products tends not just to improve a con­
sumer's functional relationship with the product but also to express 
identification as a contrarian. Apple is anti-Microsoft, TiVo is anti­
commercial television, NetFlix is anti-Blockbuster, and so on. For these 
products, the early-adopter strategy is an obvious fit. 
If this all sounds rather trendy, that's because it is. Cult brands rely on 
information specialists-fashion leaders or mavens-to convey the informa­
tion to a broad consumer base. These fashion leaders, in order to maintain 
their status as leaders, must continually be on the lookout for new insights.259 
This also leads them to consume at the upper end of the merchandise 
256. See Johnston, supra note 253. 
257. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 261 (Cal. 2002), cen granted, 537 U.S. 1099, cert. 
dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). The case settled shortly after certiorari was dismissed as improvi­
dently granted. See Johnston, supra note 253, at 1 1 1 . "[I]n the absence of potential civil liability for 
false SR claims, it may be impossible for the 'good' SR firms to effectively distinguish themselves 
from the 'bad' SR firms." Id. at 1 19. 
258. See id. at 70 (noting that nongovernmental organizations play a "crucial role" in making 
the CSR market). 
259. GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL EcONOMICS: MARKET BEHAVIOR IN A 
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 140 (2000) ("Alert leaders recognize that their distinctive behavior is only 
temporary, and are on the lookout for new ways to be distinguished from the followers who are 
closing the gap in behavior."). 
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spectrum.260 Recall that consumers are seeking not Gust) functionality, but 
(also) satisfaction of other social needs when they buy products.261 Quality 
matters. But when a consumer's assessment of the quality of a product de­
pends not just on intrinsic value but on what someone else thinks, strange 
things start to happen to demand curves and equilibrium prices. A few good 
(or bad) words from the right person can cause an avalanche.262 With these 
fads and fashions, demand is unstable, oscillating wildly following even 
small shocks.263 
* * * 
In sum, companies that sell products rich in credence qualities would 
seem to benefit most from using deal structure as a branding mechanism, 
particularly if early adopters or opinion leaders are important to their mar­
keting strategy. I offer one last example: groceries. Consumers used to have 
a more personal relationship with their grocers and butchers. In today's su­
permarkets, however, some foods have credence qualities, especially as 
consumers place a higher value on difficult-to-verify attributes like safety, 
source of origin (for example, shade-grown coffee) and organic farming 
methods.264 Whole Foods, Wild Oats, and Trader Joe's, unlike conventional 
supermarkets, refuse slotting allowances.265 Most economists consider slot­
ting allowances, which are payments made by manufacturers to retailers for 
shelf space, to be a normal consequence of the competitive market for shelf 
space.266 Trader Joe's, along with Whole Foods, instead refuses these 
260. Id. at 97 ("[L]eaders end up consuming excessively high quality merchandise in competi­
tive markets in order to be separated from other consumers."). 
261 .  Id. ("Consumers are largely paying for image, prestige, and distinctiveness, which are 
social rather than material characteristics of certain products."). 
262. Id. at 79 ("The general conclusion is that competition in social markets may magnify 
small differences in perceived quality among classes of objects into very large differences in equilib­
rium prices."). 
263. Becker & Murphy write: 
The positive slope . . . does not mean that demand in that interval rises as the price of [the] 
good increases, but rather that each household's willingness to pay for this good increases 
greatly as other households are consuming more of the good . . . .  In other words, demand is 
unstable in this interval, and explodes up or down in response even to small shocks. 
Id. at 136. 
264. Johnston, supra note 253, at 86 (noting that consumers are willing to pay premium prices 
for pesticide-free organic produce and seafood that is certified to be safe). 
265. Seth Lubove, Food Porn, FORBES, Feb. 14, 2005, at 102, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/global/2005/0207/050.html; see also RBC CAPITAL MARKETS RESEARCH 
REPORT, WILD OATS MARKETS, INC. 5 (2001) (on file with author). It is worth noting that Wild Oats' 
CEO, Perry Odak, was formerly the CEO of Ben & Jerry's. RBC CAPITAL MARKETS RESEARCH 
REPORT, supra at 8; see also Trader Joe's, How We Do Business, http://www.traderjoes.com/ 
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266. See Benjamin Klein & Joshua Wright, The Economics of Slotting Arrangements (Am. Law 
& Econ. Ass'n Ann. Meetings, Paper No. 53, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=773464; K. 
Sudhir & Vithala R. Rao, Slotting Allowances: An Empirical Investigation (Mar. 2004) (unpublished 
June 2006] Brand New Deal 1637 
arrangements, viewing them as an infringement on their commitment to pro­
vide quality products.267 Whole Foods also has an unusual executive­
compensation policy, limiting cash compensation of executives to fourteen 
times the average fulltime-employee wage.268 
CONCLUSION 
It is hard to escape the world of branding. Consumers create identity 
from the most prosaic items. Take the humble stapler. In the movie Office 
Space, a peculiar character named Milton was unusually fond of his red sta­
pler.269 After the movie achieved cult status, real-world demand for red 
staplers spiked. Swingline, the leading U.S.  manufacturer of staplers, then 
started production on red staplers. It had never produced a bright red stapler 
before.210 The experience transformed not just the demand for red staplers, 
but Swingline's entire marketing strategy: 
Now, with all the passion of a convert, Swingline says it has learned how 
to target younger office-product customers-it calls them "expressive con­
sumers"-with bright-green ergonomic designs and red, white, and blue 
paper clips. But the company insists its changes were long in the works. 
"Most people have had a Swingline on their desk, looking at the name 
every day, year after year," [Swingline's parent's vice president Bill] Car­
vell says. "People will do a lot to protect their Swingline."271 
Now suppose Swingline proposed a company policy banning the use of 
efficiency consultants. It would find little support for the policy in the aca­
demic literature on labor economics or industrial organization. Economists 
would scratch their heads. And the lawyer charged with the task of drafting 
the policy would be unlikely to get the gag.272 From a branding standpoint, 
however, the policy would make perfect sense. 
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ting Allowances and the Market for New Products, 40 J.L. & EcoN. 461 ,  463 (1997) (arguing that 
slotting allowances are consistent with competitive behavior). 
267. Trader Joe's, supra note 26S. 
268. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at SS (Mar. 7, 200S), available 
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